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The main sources for the discussion of the category “relation” were Aristotle’s Categories and 
Metaphysics. Before their translation into Arabic in the 8th and 9th centuries, Christian theolo-
gians and in their footsteps Syriac scholars considered Aristotle’s works to be a useful tool in 
Christological discussions. This article analyzes the category of relation and its development 
in Arabic-Islamic philosophy in authors such as Kindī and his student Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd, the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī and others.
Keywords: relation as dynamic principle; Aristotle; Alexandrian commentaries; Stoa; Neo-
platonism; Arabic-Islamic authors; Epistles of the Sincere Brethren; Ramon Llull
Resum. La categoria de relació en la filosofia islàmica
Les principals fonts de discussió sobre la categoria de «relació» foren les Categories i la Meta-
física d’Aristòtil. Abans de ser traduïdes a l’àrab durant els segles viii i ix, els teòlegs cristians 
i els seus seguidors siris consideraren que les obres d’Aristòtil constituïen un instrument útil en 
les discussions cristològiques. Aquest article analitza la categoria de relació i el seu desenvolu-
pament en la filosofia araboislàmica en autors com Kindī i el seu deixeble Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd i el sufí Ibn ʿArabī, entre d’altres.
Paraules clau: relació com a principi dinàmic; Aristòtil; comentaris alexandrins; Stoa; 
neoplatonisme; autors araboislàmics; Epístoles dels Germans de la Puresa; Ramon Llull
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Theological interests, intercultural relations between Antiquity, Syriac Christian-
ity and the arising Islam stimulated the interest in Aristotle’s philosophy and his 
Organon. It was transmitted and enriched with explanations by Alexandrian com-
mentators from the 4th till the 6th century. A Syriac example from pre-Islamic time 
is the monophysite priest Sergius of Rešʿaynā in the 6th century, who — similar 
to Augustinus in the footsteps of Aristotle — considered relation as something 
determined by the related subject.
The first Arabic adaptation of Aristotle’s Categories in the 8th century, attrib-
uted to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ and presumably based on a Syriac handbook, deplored 
Aristotle’s unclear definition, but could not offer another solution.
Decades after 800 AD The Book of Stones, attributed to the alchemist Ǧābir, 
offers in an excerpt from Aristotle’s Categories the interesting solution that only 
genera, not particulars are relatives. 
Shortly after, this first attempt culminated in Kindī’s (d. between 247/861 and 
259/873) classification of relativa as something without matter, as a predicate 
connected with the substance and as something existing in mind. Kindī, the first 
great philosopher of the Arabs, considered, different from Aristotle and in accord-
ance with the Alexandrians, the first four categories — substance, quantity, qual-
ity and relation — as simple, and the following six categories — “where”, “when”, 
“position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” — as something that can be con-
nected with a substance. This is further elucidated by Kindī’s student Aḥmad Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī (d. 286/899), whose short text on categories — until now 
unknown — will be published here for the first time. 
As a reaction on discussions about the value of logic as a universal valid vehi-
cle of intelligible things, superior to single languages — I refer to the dispute in 
319/932 between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim schol-
ar Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī — the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (384/994 - 456/1064) 




2. The Category of Relation in Christian and 
Syriac Transmission
3. An 8th-Century Arabic Adaptation 
Attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ
4. Other Channels of Transmission: 
 Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān
5. Alexandrian Repercussions on Kindī and 
his Student Saraḫsī
6. Language, Logic and Relation: Ibn Ḥazm 
and the Epistles of the Brethren 
of Purity
7. Stoic-Neoplatonic Repercussions  
of Relation on Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
8. Fārābī
9. Ibn Sīnā
10. Ibn Rušd and his Critique of Ghazālī
11. Ibn ʿArabī
12. Ibn Sabʿīn
13. A Medieval Latin Echo of 
Neoplatonizing Islamic Thought: 
Ramon Llull
Bibliographical references
De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica  Supplement Issue, 2018  433
Qurʾān and he combined it with his estimation of categories as universals of Ara-
bic and non-Arabic languages and as a tool for the reflexion on Creator, creation 
and the fundaments of religion. Similar to Kindī, relation is one of the four “fun-
damentals” substance, quantity, quality and relation. The attributes of the 
transcendent God are mere names without relation to the world: They do not 
require correlatives and the relation between God and creation is asymmetrical. 
Ibn Ḥazm continues the Neoplatonic trend of the “Brethren of Purity”, who 
shortly before him developed in their Epistles, in the paraphrase of Aristotle’s 
Categories, the concept of a “mental logic”, of “mental forms”, which emanate 
from the divine active intellect. Every language, the linguistic logic, mirrors this 
“mental logic”, which is a higher reality. 
The tendency of the “Brethren of Purity” to shape the Aristotelian categories 
by Neoplatonic philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emanations is fur-
ther developed by the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in Baghdad 
(d. 435/1043). He combined in his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Alexan-
drian tradition, especially Olympiodorus, with the Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of a 
transcendental relation. The Stoics had detected relation as a universal valid cate-
gory, in which all single entities are connected in the totality of all things, which 
themselves are penetrated by the pneuma, the hegemonikon, the tonos, that deter-
mines the dynamic process of interaction. Consequently, relation appears to be the 
form, the primary structure of different relata, which correspond to this form. 
Similarly, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib assumed an interdependence of form, matter and accident 
and an identity of the whole with the parts of it. For this reason, their relativa can 
be understood with the help of the comparing intellect, which creates an image of 
the perceived in the soul. The Stoic interrelation of the whole and the parts in the 
universal valid category of relation appears to be integrated in the Epistles and in 
Ibn Ḥazm in the Neoplatonic concept of the divine One with subsequent emana-
tions from the divine intellect, which determine the concept of relation created in 
the human soul.
The interpretations of Aristotle’s Categories, Alexandrian traditions, Stoic and 
Neoplatonic concepts, constituted the background for a shift to an ontological and 
metaphysical orientation, already prepared in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Fārābī (d. 
339/950 or 951) did not yet fully develop this metaphysical line and considered 
relation primarily as a problem of language. He selected the three Aristotelian 
categories “time”, “place” and “possession”, which shape relation and he distin-
guished between a relation, called iḍāfa in a specific sense and a relation, called 
nisba in an arbitrary manner by the general public, orators and poets. To avoid 
arbitrary use, Fārābī stressed the necessity of clear definitions of relation and 
relatives. He introduced the “particles of relation”, like “in” as an additional indi-
cation of a real relation with regard to “place”: In the example “Zayd is in the 
house” the relation is “surrounding”, because Zayd is surrounded by the house. 
The relation appears to be determined by the state of “surrounding” and — con-
trary to Aristotle — not by the relatives and their essences. Moreover, Fārābī’s 
discussion of relation became a part of his theory of communication, in which 
elements of other logical works by Aristotle were integrated and in which he tried 
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to reconciliate two contrary positions of the already mentioned dispute between 
Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender of logic as a universal valid vehicle of 
intelligible things and the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defender of language 
as the only access to intelligible things.
The perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, the Iranian Ibn Sīnā 
(Avicenna, d. 428/1037) was aware of earlier discussions and knew, besides Aris-
totle’s work and its commentators, Fārābī and Neoplatonism. In contrast to Fārābī, 
he made a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological, by elabo-
rating Aristotle’s discussion in his Metaphysics (V, 15. 1020 b 26 – 1021 b 10). 
Relation is based on some “notion” (maʿnā) in one of the two relatives, e.g. in the 
asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the relation fatherhood, which 
is a “notion” or “description of its existence”, of its “being with respect to some-
thing else in the father”. The “existential” relation can be apprehended in the 
intellect, which however also can “invent” relations. In addition to the notion of a 
relation between father and son in the intellect, the relation is also something 
related to the categories action and affection, cause and effect. This kind of relation 
is integrated in an emanational Neoplatonic system of the divine first cause and 
the inferior effects. This first cause is the divine universal intellect, the giver of 
forms, from which emanate, in a hierarchical order, the ten Aristotelian categories. 
These categories determine the causal relation between the divine necessarily exist-
ing One and the multiplicity of the caused, of existing matter.
The Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd (Averroes, d. 595/1198) continued the 
Neoplatonic trend and the ontological orientation. He knew Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā, 
from whom he deviated in an interesting return to Aristotle: He concentrated again 
on the substance, according to him, the fundaments of any relation. However, he 
tried to clarify Aristotle by distinguishing between an essential relation of a sub-
stance and an accidental relation, depending on the substrate, the substance. In 
addition, the relationship is something “conceptualized” in a “conceptualization” 
(taṣawwur), which is dependent on the soul. 
Herewith, he criticized Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who spoke of a plurality of 
knowledge with regard to the relation, e.g. between father and son. Ghazālī con-
sidered relation as part of an epistemological process: Knowledge connects two 
relatives, which condition each other, and which have as their principle the divine 
First, who knows himself and who knows the individual genera. Ibn Rušd denied 
Ghazālī’s epistemological aspects and did not give a clear picture of his concept 
of a Neoplatonizing indeterminate relation in its connection with the concept of 
potentiality as “a disposition” in a thing and as its inherent possibility of existing 
in actuality. He did not develop this to a clear concept of a dynamic process of 
relation between substance and relative. 
The ambivalence of relation as something essential and as something acciden-
tal to the substance, as well as the Neoplatonic background of Ibn Rušd and Ibn 
Sīnā, have some parallels in the Andalusian Ibn ʿArabī (d. 638/1240). This Sufi 
considered the Aristotelian categories as something “applicable” to the order in the 
world and as correlated to the divine aspects of the Creator, who is manifesting 
himself in the world with his attributes and who is an all-permeating infinite power 
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and infinite divine acting. Relation, the causal relation between God and world, 
appears to be transformed to a dynamic process, in which the infinite is procreated 
from the One. The Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (d. 668/1269 or 669/1271) disa-
greed with him. Ibn ʿArabī’s concept, however, appears to be favoured by the 
Catalan philosopher and mystic Ramon Llull (d. 1315 or 1316 AD), who in his 
Logica nova developed a concept of relatio substantialis, which shares with the 
Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers, including the Sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabī, 
the classification of relation as a dynamic and active principle. Moreover, he has 
in common with Ibn ʿArabī the correlation of divine attributes and Aristotelian 
categories: In his concept of correlatives he correlates God’s act of creating with 
the category of action, God’s being a Creator with the category of substance and 
God’s rule of the world with the category of passion. The category of passion 
implies a causal relation between God and His creation. Here, the category of 
relation appears as a dynamic principle and herewith it received a new orientation. 
It is the result of a long process of the rehabilitation of relation since John Scottus 
Eriugena and it is the result of Neoplatonizing Islamic thinkers.
1. Introduction
The increasing interest in the concept of relation in modern philosophy1 is the 
result of discussions about the ontology of relations in Bertrand Russell (1872-
1970) and Francis Herbert Bradley (1846-1924)2. The controversy about internal 
and external relations becomes part of a linguistic philosophy, which since Charles 
Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is regarding the category of relation as a triadic rela-
tion of a linguistic sign between speaker and interpreting listener3. The relation R 
between a and b, aRb became a topic with many perspectives, which in differing 
manner concentrate on the differing identities of a, b and R and the differing inter-
pretations of R with regard to its relata. Moreover, in modern linguistics relation 
played a central role; relation became part of the relational logic, which was dis-
cussed by Bertrand Russell in The Principles of Mathematics4 and by some fore-
runners and contemporaries in the 19th century5. A survey of the discussions in 
Islamic philosophy will be interesting, as they mirror aspects, which reappear in 
medieval and modern thought with modifications or were taken up in a selective 
manner with some actualizing and new accentuations. Simultaneously, our survey 
will try to give an idea of the context of discussions about the concept of relation 
in a historical interpretation that sheds light on continuities and discrepancies 
between past and modern philosophical debates6. We will exclude the field of 
 
1. Cf. Heil, 2016, 2015 and 2009.
2. Cf. Horstmann, 1984.
3. Cf. Oehler, 1984: 54. 
4. Russell, 1903: §§ 27-30, 94-99, 208-216.
5. Cf. Geyser, 1909.
6. Cf. Thom, 2011: 191-205, esp. 204f.
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relational syllogism7 in Arabic Logic, which since 2010 is available in an exhaus-
tive monograph8.
2. The Category of Relation in Christian and Syriac Transmission
Our survey of the discussion on the category of relation in Islamic philosophy9 
must begin with the echo of Aristotle’s Categories in the Islamic world. This book, 
which is part of the Organon10, especially chapter 7. 6 a 35 – 8 b 24, was — 
besides Aristotle, Metaphysics11 V 15. 1020 b 26 – 1021 b 10 — the main source 
for discussions about relatio12. The first transmitters already in pre-Islamic times 
were Syriac scholars, who had a great interest in Aristotle’s Organon, including 
the Categories13. Their translations of the Organon, their extracts and comments 
mirror not only the philosophical curriculum of late antiquity, which combines 
Aristotle with Neoplatonic and Christian elements and appears to be a symbiosis 
of philosophy and theology14; primarily, the motivation of Syriac scholars for their 
study of Aristotle’s Organon was the Christian theology of trinity, moreover, the 
use of dialectic in Christological discussions and later in the dialogue with Islam15. 
Already Augustinus (354-430 AD) in his work De trinitate betrays knowledge of 
Aristotle’s Categories, especially of the chapter on relation (ch. 7)16. Against this 
background the chapter on relation in the Syriac commentaries on Aristotle’s Cate-
gories deserves our interest. We will use as an example the discussion of the rela-
tives in a Treatise on the Categories of Aristotle, the Philosopher, addressed to 
Philotheos and written by Sergius of Rešʿaynāʾ (d. 536 AD)17. As in Aristotle, the 
related subject, the relative (da-lwaṯ meddem) determines the relation and not 
conversely. Sergius mentions the same examples as Aristotle and adds some more 
from the Aristotelian commentaries, mostly Ammonius and Philoponus. An addi-
 7. Cf. Oehler, 1984: 254f.
 8. El-Rouayheb, 2010.
 9. Some lexicographical remarks on the term in oriental languages can be found in Zonta (2014: 
253-258).
10. On the transmission of the Organon in Syriac and Arabic, cf. Dictionnaire des philosophes 
antiques: Henri Hugonnard-Roche (1989: 502-513) and Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal (510-512).
11. On the transmission in Syriac and Arabic cf. Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques: Aubert Mar-
tin (528-531) and Cecilia Martini Bonadeo (Supplement [2003] 259-264).
12. We use the Greek text in the edition of Minio-Paluello, 1949; the English translation ed. by Barnes, 
1984; the German translation, with extensive introduction on the history of research and the 
reception until modern times and with detailed commentary by Oehler, 1984. A symbolization (cf. 
Thom, 2011: 193f.) of Aristotle’s chapter on relatives can be found in Mignucci, 1986.
13. On the oldest Syriac translation of Aristotle’s Categories, perhaps in the first half of the 6th centu-
ry, see the edition and translation by King, 2010 (introduction: 18-38) and 2011.
14. This is the conclusion of King, 2015 (cf. also his edition of the oldest Syriac translation of Aris-
totle’s Categories; King, 2010: 6f.).
15. Cf. Daiber, 2001: 327-345, esp. 328f. and 340. On the reception of Aristotle’s Categories cf. 
Daiber, 2001: 332, 337, 338, 339, 340-342; in addition Daiber, 2012b: 40-54, esp. 45-49 / English 
version: 74-94, esp. 81-85.
16. Cf. Augustinus, De trinitate (2001: XXXIIff., XXXVI-XXXVIII, XLVf.), and Kany, 2007: 66-71, 
497-500.
17. Ed and transl. by Aydın, 2016: 145-149 (§§ 74-79).
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tion is the example of a symmetrical relation R(x,y) ↔ R(y,x), saying that “equal 
is equal to equal”18 and the example of a “friend which is friend of a friend”19. 
Contrary to what Sergius and his sources Ammonius20 and Philoponus21 in accord-
ance with Aristotle22 called relatives “homonymously”, “heteronymously” is called 
a relative23 in the Aristotelian examples master and slave24 or knower and known25. 
To these examples Sergius and his Greek sources add the relation of father and son 
— without realizing the asymmetrical feature of this relation26: R (father, son) is 
not identical with R (son, father). Nor do they realize the internal relation between 
father and son27: Only that person can be called father, who can be father of a child. 
In this sense Augustinus could say in a long discussion and critic of Arians and 
Sabellians: “dicitur ergo relatiue pater idemque relatiue dicitur principium […]; 
sed pater ad filium dicitur, principium uero ad omnia quae ab ipso sunt. Item dic-
itur relatiue filius”28. Aristotle’s discussion of relation appears to be integrated in 
Augustinusʾ concept of Christian trinity, which is based on the dichotomy of the 
independent divine essence and the relative29. Augustinus belonged to those Chris-
tian theologians, who paved the way for the empathy for Aristotelian logic in 
Christian and later in Muslim circles30.
After the rise of Islam these Christian theologians became transmitters of Greek 
texts and thoughts31. They knew Greek, they spoke Syriac-Aramaic and Arabic in 
the West — or Pehlevi during or after the end of the Sassanian Empire (224-651 
AD) in the East. They took over the logical curriculum of Alexandrian philoso-
phers, however in a shortening shape, which included Prophyry’s Isagoge, Aris-
totle’s Categories, De interpretatione and Analytica priora — this work mostly32 
only until book I 733. 
3. An 8th-Century Arabic Adaptation Attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffa‘
The earliest example in Arabic of this shortening version is a systematizing para-
phrase attributed to Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ34 in the 8th centu-
18. Olympiodorus, 1902: 99, 24.
19. Elias, 1900: 202, 33f.
20. Ammonius, 1895: 67, 16f.
21. Philoponus (olim Ammonius), 1898: 105, 1f.
22. Aristotle, Cat. 1. 1a1-13.
23. Ammonius, 1895: 67, 17-26; Philoponus, 1898: 105, 3-11. 
24. Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 a 30; 7 a 35-39.
25. Aristotle “knowledge” and “knowledge of the knowable” (Aristotle, Cat. 6 b 34).
26. Cf. Oehler, 1984: 243f.
27. Oehler, 1984: 248.
28. Augustinus, De trinitate V 13 and 14 (2001: 386-387).
29. Cf. Kany, 2007: 498f.
30. See ch. 6.
31. Cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 25-30 / German version (Rudolph): 54-60, 66-71 / 
English version (Gutas): 108-113.
32. On the reasons for this shortening version and on exceptions cf. Daiber, 2001: 332-336.
33. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 69f. / English version (Gutas): 111f.
34. On him, cf. Latham, 1990; Ess, 1992: 27.
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ry35. The colophon of the unique Beyrouth-Ms. mentions as translator of the work 
until Analytica priora I 7 the Melkite Christian Hīlyā, whom we cannot identify 
and whom Dimitri Gutas36 assumes as the real translator of the work in the midst 
of the 2nd/8th century. According to Gutas, Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, the famous prosewrit-
er or translator from Pehlevi, or his son, might have improved the Arabic of the 
translation, which later again might have been improved by two more translators 
also mentioned in the colophon of the manuscript, namely the Christian Abū Nūḥ 
and the Persian Salm from Harran. This explanation has indeed some probability, 
and in view of the name of the translator, Hīlyā, a rendering of the Christian name 
Elias with Aramaic ending -ā and the initial <H>, which in Syriac script is a vocal 
letter for Greek ε37, the text might be an Arabic version of one of the numerous 
Syriac handbooks38 on Aristotle’s Organon, discussing in a systematic way the 
main topics from Porphyry’s Isagoge until the Analytica priora I 7. Here we 
include a translation of the chapter on the relative:
§ 44 After he (sc. Aristotle) had finished the part with the chapter (qismat bāb) on 
the quantity39 and (his) record of its specification (ḥilya)40, he began the chapter 
on the relative (al-muḍāf). He said: The part on the relative consists of homony-
ma (al-muttafiq al-asmāʾ) and heteronyma (al-muḫtalif al-asmāʾ). Examples of 
the homonyma are the brother, the friend, the comrade (aṣ-ṣāḥib), the companion 
(al-ʿašīr), the partner (aš-šarīk), the neighbour and the similar and so on. Because 
a man is the brother of his brother, the friend of his friend, the comrade of his 
comrade and the similar of what is similar to him. Examples of the heteronyma 
are the height and the bottom, the fundamental (al-aṣl) and the derivative (al-farʿ), 
the father and the child, the patron and the citizens (ar-rāʿī wa-r-raʿiyya, also “the 
shepherd and the herd” or “the pastor and the parish”), “the ruler and the ruled” 
35. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, 1978. At the end of the 10th century the catalogue of books, the Fihrist by Ibn 
an-Nadīm, mentions the work by Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ as one of the “abbreviations and epitomes”; see 
the translation by Peters, 1968: 6. 
36. In Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 72-74 / English version: 114-116. 
37. Cf. Daiber, 1980: 306, n. 350.
38. Possible Syriacisms: The term qisma in the expressions qismat bāb al- “the part with the chapter” 
and qismat al-muḍāf an minhū “the part on the relative consists” is possibly an incorrect rendering 
of the Syriac purrāšā with the two meanings “separation” and “explanation”, of which the trans-
lator erroniously rendered the first meaning “separation” and literally translated it with qisma, 
apparently with the assumption that qisma has also the second meaning of purrāšā, i.e. “explana-
tion”. — Another example might be ḥilya “ornament, quality” (Lane s.v.), which we translated 
with “specification” (= peculiarity of the relative): Among possible Syriac renderings the Syriac 
dīlāytā “proprietas”, “property, quality, characteristic” or dīlāyūṯā “proprietas”, “property, quality, 
attribute” or dīlānāyūṯā “proprietas”, “peculiarity, property” seem to have misled the translator to 
the assumption that ḥilya has the same semantic field and connotations as dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā or 
dīlānāyūṯā. On the Syriac words cf. Payne Smith, 1879-1901: col. 882 and 883 (dīlāytā, dīlāyūṯā, 
dīlānāyūṯā); col. 3304f. (purrāšā) and the English renderings in Payne Smith, 1990: 439. Possibly 
this Syriac background affected in Greek-Arabic translations of the 9th century the rendering of 
ἰδέα “Aussehen, Form, Erscheinung” and of χαρακτήρ with ḥilya. For references see Ullmann, 
2002: 304f; and 2007, Supplement II: 796.
39. al-ʿadad for ποσόν (= Aristotle, Cat. 6) also used by Ibn ʿArabī (see Nyberg, 1919: 33). The tra-
ditional term is kamm. On the possible Syriacism of the expression qismat bāb see n. 38.
40. On this term, possibly a Syriacism, see n. 38.
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(al-mālik wa-l-mamlūk), the half and the double, the container and the contained, 
the knower and the knowledge.
§ 45 He said: The substances of things (aʿyān al-umūr) should not be confused 
with the relation to them (iḍāfatuhā). And nobody should maintain the relation 
of a riding animal to people with the expression “the horse of so and so” or “the 
donkey of so and so”. Thus, the horses and the donkeys belong to the category of 
the relative (al-muḍāf), not to the substances (al-aʿyān). It can be said “the hand of 
so and so” and “the foot of so and so”: The hands and the feet belong to the relative. 
Therefore, they do not belong to the substances, but let people know that the horse 
and the donkey are not related to so and so through its fundamentals. However, 
both are related to (so and so), because he has both, without being in him some 
horseness or donkeyness (al-farasiyya wa-l-ḥimāriyya). It is said “the hand of so 
and so” and “the foot of so and so”; both are related (to so and so) only through 
interpretation (taʾwīl) of the fundamentals and the derivatives. The fundamentals 
and the derivatives are related to each other. In this way it can be said “the father 
of so and so” without occurence of the relation (between father and child) because 
of the humanness (al-insāniyya). The father, but not the child is indeed (p. 17) a 
human before he gets a child. However, they both are related to each other through 
(their) humanness which exists between both. Each of both belongs to the category 
of the substances with regard to the fundamental (al-aṣl) and to the category of the 
relative (al-muḍāf) with regard to (its) relationship (an-nasab). 
§ 46 He (Aristotle) has searched for a definiton of the relative (al-muḍāf) but was 
not able. He was content with (its) specification (al-ḥilya) and said: (with regard 
to) the knowledge of the relative the one shall not precede the other: The father is 
not known until the child is known; the right side is not known until the left side 
is known; and the half is not known until the double is known. If one of the two 
names ceases to exist, (also) the other ceases to exist.
The relative
To (the relative) belong the homonyma (al-muttafiq al-asmāʾ), like the similar and 
dissimilar, the (one) brother and the (other) brother, the (one) partner (aš-šarīk) 
and the (other) partner.
The specification (ḥilya) of the relative is (the fact) that the one (the substance) 
precedes the other (the relative). 
To it belong the heteronyma, like the height and the bottom, the father and the child 
and the fundamental (al-aṣl) and the derivative (al-farʿ) 41.
The text allows two observations:
1) It is written as a guideline to Aristotle’s discussion by concentrating on the 
crucial points and by admitting that Aristotle was not able to give a clear definition 
of the relative (Arab. t. 17, 3). The explanation of “relation” is included in a short 
survey, from which it becomes evident that “the fundamental” (al-aṣl) of “the 
41. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, 1978: 16, 11-17, 10 (§§ 44-46).
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substance” (al-ʿayn) precedes “the relative” (al-muḍāf), also called “the derivative” 
(al-farʿ) and determines “the relation” (al-iḍāfa). The relatives are “homonyma”, 
in case they have identical names and the same identities, like “humanness” — we 
can add: If they correlate or if there is a symmetrical relation — otherwise they are 
“heteronyma”.
2) The examples for “homonyma” and “heteronyma” correspond to those found 
in Aristotle and the Alexandrian commentators (s. above) — with the following 
exceptions: Different from the main points at the end of the chapter on the relative, 
the text at the beginning mentions the additional examples “comrade” (aṣ-ṣāḥib), 
“companion” (al-ʿašīr), “neighbour” (al-ǧār) and “patron and the citizens” (ar-rāʿī 
wa-r-raʿiyya). These examples and the example of the “partner” (aš-šarīk) were 
missing in Aristotle and the commentators. They might be added by the translator 
or, in our case more likely, by the redactor, supposedly Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, who in 
his Kitāb al-ādāb al-kabīr, an instruction in the behaviour of rulers and ruled, used 
different names for the “friend” and the “comrade”42, including those added in our 
text to the examples of Aristotle and the commentators.
4. Other Channels of Transmission: Gˇa¯bir Ibn  .Hayya¯n
The text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ scarcely had any echo in later philosophical 
literature43. We can assume that before the Arabic translation of the Categories by 
Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (d. 298/910 or 911) there existed more channels of transmission. 
A slightly expanded paraphrase of the Categories is excerpted in the Book of Stones 
(Kitāb al-Aḥǧār) attributed to Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān and perhaps written “decades after 
800 AD”44. Regrettably, this excerpt is restricted to Aristotle, Cat. 8. 8 b 25 - 11 a 
42. Cf. Daiber, 2015b: 277-279.
43. An echo might be Dāwūd Ibn Marwān al-Muqammiṣ (or: al-Muqammaṣ),ʿIšrūn Maqāla, the 
earliest extant work of Jewish philosophy written in Arabic in the first half of the 9th century in 
the style of a Kalām work and using Aristotelian logic as a tool for his theology. See the edition 
and annotated translation by Stroumsa, 1989. A new edition with revised introduction recently 
appeared in 2016 (see here bibliography). Muqammiṣ gives a list of the 10 categories substance 
and the accidents “quantity”, “quality”, “relative”, “when”, “where”, “position”, “possession”, 
“action” and “passion” (ed. transl. Stroumsa, 1989: 55 / 54) similar to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (1978: 11, 
2-8; cf. 11, 24-12, 5): Both use the Arabic term ǧida “possession” (see Lane, 1893: 2924, col. c); 
the same term can be found in Ibn Sīnā, 1974: 75, 3. Stroumsa wrongly “state (attribution)”. 
However, there are terminological differences and moreover, Muqammiṣ (ch. 1 § 8, ed. and transl. 
Stroumsa, 1989: 48/49) contains among other references a quotation from Aristotle, Cat. 8. 11 a 
16-20 on the category of quality, which cannot be found in the text of Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. As 
al-Muqammiṣ seems to have known Syriac (see Stroumsa, 1989: 19), he might have used a 
Greek-Syriac textbook, which was also a source of the text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ. It might 
be tempting to parallelize the concept of substance and relative in Ibn al-Muqaffa῾ with the noun 
and its adjective, musnad and musnad ilayhi and to see a similarity to early grammarians, like 
al-Farrāʾ and Sībawayh: cf. Ighbariah, 2016: 254-258.
44. David E. Pingree in the foreword to Nomanul Haq, 1994: X; Gannagé (2005: 85 and 92) concludes 
from her comparison with the translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn that the version of the Kitāb 
al-Aḥǧār is later than Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn and must be in its terminology later than the 2nd half of 
the 9th century. Presumably, the text is not a paraphrase by Ǧābir and instead based on a Greek 
Hellenistic paraphrase.
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3745, on “quality” (kayfiyya); only at its end, in the section (Arab. t. 33, 11-17 / 
transl. 240f.) corresponding to Aristotle, Cat. 8. 11 a 20-39, we find a remarkable 
addition to Aristotle’s explanation: Only genera and not particulars can be a rela-
tive; knowledge is related to the known, but not to particular knowledge: The 
Ǧābir-text identifies the genera (aǧnās) with “universals” (kulliyya) in contrast to 
the particulars (al-ǧuzwiyāt = al-ǧuzʾiyāt; al-ašḫāṣ). 
5. Alexandrian Repercussions on Kindı¯ and his Student Sara
˘
hsı¯
In a similar manner and presumably during the same time, perhaps in the first 
half of the 3rd/9th century, the first great Islamic philosopher Kindī (d. between 
247/861 and 259/873), also called “philosopher of the Arabs” (faylasūf al-ʿarab), 
declared the relative to be something “existing without matter” (al-mawǧūd lā 
maʿa ṭīna); he reckoned it among the “connected predicates of the substance” 
(al-murakkaba min maḥmūlāt al-ǧawhar) and argued that “fatherhood and son-
ship derive from the relation that each of the two has to the other and exists 
through the existence of the other, (just) like the part through the whole. Both 
are thus in their characterization not connected with matter”46. Kindī, addition-
ally in his division of the categories47, as well as the paraphrase of the Aristote-
lian text in Ǧābir, follow in their specifications and deviations Alexandrian tra-
dition, as parallels in the commentaries by Olympiodorus, Elias and Simplicius 
show48. These commentators consider categories in singular cases as something 
existing in mind49.
Kindī’s distinction between simple (mufrada) and connected “predicates of sub-
stances” (maḥmūlāt al-ǧawāhir) is a part of the Alexandrian50 division between 
On the attribution of the corpus Ǧabirianum to different periods cf. Daiber, review of Paul 
Kraus, Jābir Ibn Ḥayyān (1942, reprint Paris 1986), in Bibliotheca Orientalis 47, 1990, 236f.
45. Arabic paraphrase ed. Nomanul Haq, 1994: 30, 1-33, ult.; partly translated and compared with the 
translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, 230-242. The Arabic text in transliteration, with additional col-
lation of two more mss. and adding a comparison with the translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, can 
also be found in Gannagé, 2005: 93-101; additional passages can be found on 101-103.
46. Kindī, 1978: 370, 14 - 371, 3. An English translation by Gutas (slightly differing from ours), in 
addition to some more passages (Kindī, 1978: 370, 11-13; 371, 4 - 372, 1) can be found in Thom, 
2015: 31, n. 3. Recently, Adamson and Pormann published an English translation of Kindī’s 
Risāla. See their English translation, 2012: 281-296 and the quoted passage 285, partly differing 
from our translation; instead of “(just) like the part through the whole. Both are thus in their 
characterization not connected with matter” the translators have: “But part and whole are not 
separate from matter in position”, apparently replacing Arabic fī waṣfihā by fī waḍʿihā.
47. See the article by Thom, 2015: 30-33.
48. See Thom, 2015: 32f. On Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in Arabic transmission 
cf. Chase, 2008: 11f. and (on al-Fārābī) 17-19.
49. Cf. ἐνθύμημα, Olympiodorus, 1902: 55, 28; νοεῖται, Elias, 1900: 159, 15 and below n. 140. Sim-
plicius differs insofar as he considers relation (σχέσις) as εἶδος and λόγος, in which the relatives 
participate (Simplicius, 1907: 174, 30 - 175, 3; translated Luna, 1987: 122f.; Simplicius apparent-
ly did not consider the relation as product of the intellect, which compares the things (cf. Luna, 
1987: 116).
50. Cf. Elias, 1990: 159, 21 (άπλαῖ σύνθετοι).
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simple and connected categories51. Differing from Aristotle, who regarded the ten 
categories “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “posi-
tion”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” as something existing absolutely and 
“without connection (συμπλοκή)” with something else52, only the first four catego-
ries were considered by the Alexandrians as something “simple” (ἁπλαῖ) and the 
remaining six as “connected” (σύνθετοι)53. Interestingly, this division of the cate-
gories reappears in a short summary of the categories by Kindī’s student Aḥmad 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī (d. 286/899), which until now was assumed to be lost54.
We edit the text from the unique Ms.55:
من رسالة احمد بن الطيب السرخسي
المقولات  عشرة  وهى  تنقسم  قسمين  اما  بسيطة  واما  مركبة٠ 
والبسيطة  اربعة  اقسام : جوهر  كسماء  وارض  وكم  كذراعين  وثلثة 
وكيف  كبياض  وسواد  ومضاف  كضعف  النصف  ونصف  الضعف؛ 
والمركبة  ستة  اقسام : اين  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر    مع  مكان  كفلان 
في  السوق  ومتى  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر  مع  زمان  ككان  فلان  امس 
ويكون  غدا   وملك  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر  مع  جوهر  كلفلان  عبد  وخادم 
ونصبة  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر  مع  جوهر  كفلان  مستقيم56   على 
الارض  وفاعل  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر  مع   كيف  كفلان  يقطع  وفلان 
يحرق  ومنفعل  وهى  من  تركيب  جوهر  مع  كيف  كمنقطع  ومحترق؛
From a Treatise by Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī
The categories are ten. They can be divided into two parts, into simple and into 
connected. The simple consist of four parts: “Substance”, for example heaven and 
earth; “quantity”, for example two or three cubits57; “quality”, for example whi-
teness58 and blackness; “relative”, for example double of the half and half of the 
double59. The connected (categories) consist of six parts: “where”, that means a 
51. Cf. Elias, 1900: 159, 14-24.
52. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 1 b 25-26.
53. Elias, 1900: 159, 20-21.
54. Muḫtaṣar (Iḫtiṣār) Kitāb Qāṭīġūriyās. The title is mentioned by Rosenthal, 1943: 54 (with reference 
to Arabic bio-bibliographical sources), followed by Hans Hinrich Biesterfeldt in Philosophie in 
der islamischen Welt I, 151 / English version: 223. 
55. Saraḫsī, Aya Sofya, 4855 (copied 733/1333), fol. 71r, 1-9.
56. Ms. ﻖﻠﺘﺴﻣ 
57. The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 1 b 30 and Elias, 1900: 158, 35.
58. The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4 2 a 1 and Elias, 1900: 158, 35.
59. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1 (“double, half, greater”); Elias, 1900: 159, 1 has the example of father and 
son.
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substance can be connected with a place, for example so-and-so in the market60; 
“when”, that means a substance can be connected with time, for example so-and-
so was yesterday61 and will be tomorrow; “possession”, that means a substance 
can be connected with another substance, for example so-and-so has a slave and a 
servant62; “position” (nuṣba), that means a substance can be connected with another 
substance, for example so-and-so stands upright on the earth63; “action”, that means 
a substance can be connected with quality, for example so-and-so cuts and so-and-
so burns64; “passion”, that means a substance can be connected with quality, for 
example being cut and being burnt65.
6.  Language, Logic and Relation:   
Ibn  .Hazm and the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity
Like his teacher Kindī66, Saraḫsī was engaged in disputes with Christians and could 
use his knowledge of the Aristotelian Organon in his arguments against the Chris-
tians, especially against the doctrine of the trinity67. 
The method to use Greek logic against Christian doctrine and belief continued 
to be a standard in the 10th century — despite some dispute between Christian and 
Muslim scholars about the value of logic: I refer to the discussion in 319/932 
between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim scholar Abū 
Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī (d. 368/979), a commentator of the grammar by Sībawayh (d. ca. 
180/796)68. According to Abū Bišr, logic is a universal valid vehicle of intelligible 
things for all nations and superior to languages, which differ among the people and 
require logic in their grammar. Despite the compromise of Abū Bišr’s pupil Yaḥyā 
Ibn ʿAdī (d. 363/974) to identify logic with universal grammar that is behind any 
particular language, Sīrāfī defends language as only access to intelligible things. 
Against Hellenism he propagates “clear Arabic language” as it is revealed by God 
in the Qurʾān. 
This reminds us of the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm (d.456/1064) who, through 
his teachers, seems to have had some links with the Baghdad school of logic, 
including Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus69. He used the Aristotelian Organon in his 
critique of Christian belief and in addition he based his refutation on the textual 
basis of the Qurʾān and its “clear” (ẓāhir) meanings. His logical work at-Taqrīb 
60. The example can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1.
61. Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 1.
62. A different example in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 2 (“has”, “shoes”, “weapons”).
63. Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 2 and Elias, 1900: 159, 2 (κεῖται, καθήμενος, ‘εστώς).
64. The examples can be found in Aristotle, Cat. 4. 2 a 4 and (“cut”) Elias, 1900: 159, 1.
65. The examples can be found in Aristotle, Cat.4. 2 a 4 and (“cut”) Elias, 1900: 159, 1.
66. On Kindī’s use of Aristotelian logic for his refutation of Christian trinity cf. Endress/Adamson in 
Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 126f. / English version: 192f.
67. Cf. the references given by Biesterfeldt in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 150 / English 
version: 224.
68. Cf. Endress, 1986; id. in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 202f.; 299-301 / English version: 
295f.; 432-434; Versteegh, 1997: 52-63; Adamson and Key, 2015.
69. Cf. Ramón Guerrero, 2013: 413f.; Lameer, 2013: 421-426.
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li-ḥadd al-manṭiq70 (written between 1025 and 1029) is written as a methodolog-
ical introduction to his theology and his refutation of Christianity. It begins with 
Porphyry’s Isagoge and continues with the Categories, On Interpretation, followed 
by Analytica priora, Analytica posteriora, Topics and Sophistical Refutations, 
which Ibn Ḥazm joins together under the title Kitāb al-Burhān “Book on Demon-
stration”, finally Rhetorics and Poetics. As in his critique of Kindī’s metaphysics, 
which is mainly based on the Neoplatonism of Proclus71, Ibn Ḥazm propagates in 
his refutation of Christianity a strict concept of God’s transcendence, of God’s 
tawḥīd. Ibn Ḥazm based his critique on concepts of logic and language in the 
Organon and the clear meanings of the Qurʾān. The Christians, however, distorted 
and falsified (tabdīl, taḥrīf) their fundaments, the gospels which were full of con-
tradictions (munāqaḍāt)72. Aristotle’s categories (Cat. 2-5) are universals73 of lan-
guage (not only of Arabic)74. Similar to the nominalism of medieval scholastics 
they are mere terms75, which on the basis of logic are a tool for the correct reflex-
ion and knowledge of Creator, creation and the fundaments of religion, its texts, 
which must be interpreted as they are and not allegorically. Language and logic 
are in the service of Islamic theology and polemics against Christianity. 
Here, Aristotle’s concept of relation in his Categories becomes fundamentally 
important. Ibn Ḥazm76 mentions it as one of the “four fundamentals” (ar-ruʾūs 
al-arbaʿa)77 “substance”, “quantity”, “quality” and “relation”78, which as we have 
seen79, in accordance with the Alexandrian and Kindian tradition appear as “sim-
ple” categories and which can be “connected” with the categories “when” 
(az-zamān)80, “where” (al-makān)81, “position” (an-nuṣba)82, “possession” (al-
milk)83, “action” (al-fāʿil)84 and “passion” (al-munfaʿil)85. According to Ibn Ḥazm, 
God’s names, His attributes, correctly must be understood as categories without 
relation to the created, as this would contradict God’s transcendence. Through 
reason (al-ʿaql) the soul comes to know that “the (divine) acting (al-fāʿil) is acting 
70. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987. A short analytical survey of the contents can be found in Ramón Guerrero, 2013: 
407-415 and in Ibn Ḥazm of Cordoba. The Life and Works of a Controversial Thinker (as n. 69), 
743-746.
71. Cf. Daiber, 1986a.
72. See the monograph by Behloul, 2002 and 2013.
73. Cf. Behloul, 2002: 38.
74. Cf. Behloul, 2002: 61-67. Herewith Ibn Ḥazm differs from as-Sīrāfī, who contradicts Abū Bišr 
Mattā Ibn Yūnus (see above).
75. Cf. Behloul, 2002: 41-43.
76. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 134-173; cf. the analysis (of which we deviate in several points) in Behloul, 2002: 
44-96.
77. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 165, 3; cf. Behloul, 2002: 57 and Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 144, 7.
78. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 161, 13 - 165, 3.
79. See above ch. 5.
80. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 165, 4 - 167, 9.
81. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 167, 10 - 170, 16.
82. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 170, 17-20.
83. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 171, 1-7.
84. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 171, 8 - 172, 5.
85. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 172, 6 - 173, 12.
De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica  Supplement Issue, 2018  445
(fāʿil) through (His) action (bi-l-fiʿl) or endowed with action (ḏū l-fiʿl)”86. Here-
with, Ibn Ḥazm contradicts those, who maintain in an inacceptable syllogism: 
The acting is a body because of its action
the Creator is acting
therefore the Creator is a body87.
Ibn Ḥazm was aware of the existence of an asymmetrical relation between God 
and creation. God’s acting, hearing, seeing and being living, as it is mentioned in 
the Qurʾān, do not require a correlative. These attributes are proper names of the 
Creator, who is neither genus nor species or bearer of accidents88. Herewith, the 
Creator cannot be called one of the simple or connected categories. The expression 
“God is acting” has the meaning that the predicate “is acting” has a relation to God 
— not because God is a substance and has the accident “acting”. Simultaneously, 
God’s acting does not require an object. God’s autarkeia89 became a first step in 
a deviation from the concept of a substance; God is not a substance with accidents, 
to which God’s creation is “related” (muḍāf), because of the accidents of this 
substance; therefore, Kindī’s concept of a relation between the divine ʿilla, the 
cause, and its creation, the maʿlūl, the caused, restricts God’s transcendence.
Ibn Ḥazm combines his concept of logic as a tool for everyone90 with his ideal 
of striving after knowledge through everyone, as far as he is capable to do so91.
Here, it is helpful to draw the attention to an encyclopedia, compiled shortly 
before Ibn Ḥazm in scholarly circles of the Irak, the Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ, The 
Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. They propagate the striving after encyclopedic 
knowledge with the aim to “purify the soul and improve the character” as a way 
of salvation leading to the final stage in the other world92. Knowledge includes 
logic, one of the propaedeutical sciences, preceding natural sciences, psychology 
and epistemology, finally theology and religious sciences. The section on logic 
(Epistles 10-14)93 is considered as the best way to truth, to God, a tool to help men 
to imitate God94. It starts with a paraphrase (with deviations) of Porphyry’s Isago-
86. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 164, 10f. / Behloul, 2002: 55.
87. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 164, 8 / Behloul, 2002: 55.
88. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 164, 11-18 / Behloul, 2002: 55f.
89. See on this Neoplatonic concept in Ibn Ḥazm, Daiber, 1986a: 289f.
90. Herewith, he differs from Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd and apparently also from scholars in Alexandria, 
according to whom Aristotle was understandable only by those, who were capable to it. Cf. 
Behloul, 2002: 30-33, with reference to Gutas. With regard to Ibn Sīnā, we should be aware that 
this philosopher regarded philosophical truth as something based on intuition and divine inspira-
tion, which is not accessible to everyone. The limitations of knowledge, according to Ibn Sīnā, do 
not justify to attribute to him an obfuscatory method with the purpose to conceal knowledge from 
the unworthy. Cf. Daiber, 2004b.
91. Cf. Ibn Ḥazm, 1987: 100f. / Behloul, 2002: 28-30.
92. Cf. Daiber, rev. of Susanne Diwald (Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie, 
Kitāb Iḫwān aṣ-ṣafāʾ (III), Wiesbaden 1975), Orientalistische Literaturzeitung 76, 1981, col. 46f.; 
Philosophie der islamischen Welt I, 536 / English version 756 (Daniel De Smet).
93. Edited and translated by Baffioni, 2010.
94. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 2-3; 16.
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ge (Epistle 10)95 and continues with Aristotle’s Categories (Epistle 11)96 and De 
Interpretatione (Epistle 12)97. The following references to Aristotle’s Prior 
Analytics (Epistle 13)98 and Posterior Analytics (Epistle 14)99 are limited. As Epist-
le 13 mainly quotes from the first six chapters of Aristotle’s Analytica priora book 
I100 and as Aristotle’s Topics, Sophistical Refutations, Rhetoric and Poetics are 
omitted101, we are reminded of the restricted curricula of the Alexandrians and 
their echo in Syriac and early Arabic textbooks on logic, beginning with Prophyry’s 
Isagoge and ending with Aristotle’s Analytica priora I 7. A confirmation of the 
Alexandrian background102 is the classification of logic as “mental logic” 
(al-manṭiq al-fikrī) or “mental concepts” or “forms”103. Following Neoplatonic 
philosophy, the Epistles let them emanate from God into the active intellect, then 
into the Universal Soul, into prime matter and finally into the human souls104. 
Consequently, any spoken language, the linguistic logic, mirrors that mental logic, 
a higher reality. This linguistic logic is more than grammar and enables reason, by 
using syllogism, to reveal contradictions of speeches and to distinguish between 
falsehood and truth105.
Further Alexandrian traditions are mirrored in the chapter on the relatives106:
1) The Epistles distinguish between “parallel” (an-naẓīr) and “non-parallel” 
(ġayr an-naẓīr) relatives, what corresponds to the Alexandrian distinction between 
“homonyma” and “synonyma”107; to the examples of both kinds, taken from Aris-
totle108, the Epistles add examples found in Alexandrian commentators, in the 
Syriac text of Sergius and in the Arabic Epitome attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ109. 
 95. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 5-9.
 96. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 9-12; Arabic text edited Baffioni, 2010: 45-76; English version by Baffioni, 
2010: 87-99 (cf. Baffioni, 2010: 9-12 and the summary Baffioni, 2010: 21f.).
 97. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 12-14 and 22.
 98. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 14-16 and 23.
 99. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 16-21.
100. As has been observed by Baffioni, 2010: 23.
101. See Baffioni, 2010: 3.
102. Cf. above ch. 2 and 5.
103. Baffioni, 2010: 7 and 9.
104. Baffioni, 2010: 7 and Epistle n. 10, ch. 11; Baffioni’s “Conclusion”, 2010: 31-33, which gives a 
clear picture of the interesting combination of Neoplatonic emanationism with Islamic revelation, 
of religion and logic. Cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 536f. / English version: 757f. 
(Daniel De Smet).
105. Cf. Baffioni, 2010: 28-30. On the theory of speaking in the Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ cf. also Versteegh, 
1997: 93-97.
106. Arabic text ed. Baffioni, 2010: 65, 1-68, 7 / English translation Baffioni, 2010: 94f. Some echoes 
can be found in Ibn Sabʿīn, see ch. 12.
107. See above ch. 2. Accordingly the explanation by Baffioni, 2010: 11 must be revised. The same 
distinction with mostly identical examples (taken from the Alexandrian tradition) reappears later 
in Ibn Ḥazm, 1978: 162, 14 - 163, 5. Against Ramón Guerrero, 2013: 413, this can be taken as 
an indication that Ibn Ḥazm had some knowledge of the Epistles, which seem to have been known 
in Andalus around 1000 AD.
108. See the references to Aristotle, given in the notes in Baffioni, 2010: 94.
109. Namely the examples of the brother, the neighbour and the friend. See above ch. 2 and 3. 
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2) The Epistles distinguish between four simple and six composite relatives110, 
without giving a clear information about the simple four categories (i.e. “sub-
stance”, “quality”, “quantity”, “relation”). They can be combined with the six 
categories “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”, 
which are described in detail111.
The texts and their authors, whom we have discussed so far, mirror the Aristo-
telian concept of categories and Aristotle’s explanation of the category “relation”, 
often shaped by the Alexandrian commentators and increasingly by Neoplatonic 
philosophy about God’s transcendence and the emanations. This reveals to be an 
important background for new accentuations after the first great philosopher Kindī 
— namely in Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd. 
7.  Stoic-Neoplatonic Repercussions of Relation  
on Abu¯ l-Faragˇ Ibn a.t- .Tayyib
Before we enter into the discussion of these philosophers we should mention, for 
the sake of completeness, an epigone of the Aristotelian-Alexandrian tradition at 
the turn from the 10th to the 11th century, the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib in Baghdad (d. 435/1043)112. His commentary on Aristotle’s Categories 
follows Alexandrian tradition, especially Olympiodorus113. The section on “rela-
tion”114 has been analysed by the editor of the Arabic text115. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib was 
mainly concerned with an explanation of the Aristotelian text, which is in parts 
included and systematically commented along Alexandrian tradition, mainly with 
regard to formal aspects, the arrangement of the categories, their kinds, their 
nature, their description and their terminology. At first sight the result is not very 
original. It deserves our attention as his Alexandrian distinction between homon-
ymy and heteronymy of the “relative” (al-muttafiqa asmāʾuhā / al-mutabāyina 
asmāʾuhā)116, which we come across since the 8th century117, stimulated Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib to some reflexion on the role of the intellect (al-ʿaql) in the comparison 
(muqāyasa)118. Relativa, which are “distant from each other” (al-mutabāʿidāt), can 
only be “understood” (yufham) by analogy (qiyās)119. And in the discussion of 
Aristotle, Cat. 7. 8 a 13 — 8 b 21 and 7 b 15 — 8 a 12 about the relativa of the 
whole and the part of it, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib distinguishes between the perceived 
110. On this cf. above ch. 5 the texts by Kindī and his pupil Saraḫsī and their Alexandrian background.
111. Arabic text ed. Baffioni, 2010: 66, 7 - 68, 7 / English translation Baffioni, 2010: 94f.
112. On him cf. Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 346-352 / English version: 496-506 (Ferrari).
113. See edition and analysis by Ferrari, 2006. 
114. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 251-300.
115. Ferrari, 2007: 471-476. The article appeared, slightly changed, also in Ferrari’s edition, 2006: 
85-91.
116. Cf. (partly with varying terminology) ed. Ferrari, 2006: 253, 2 (nisbat al-wifāq wa-l-ḫilāf); 253, 
6 and 14f.; 257, 32f.; 258, 1; 261, 16 - 262, 2; 288, 21-28, etc.
117. See above ch. 3.
118. Cf. ed. Ferrari, 2006: 256, 10-14.
119. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 288, 16; cf. 291, 16 - 292, 7.
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(al-maḥsūs) of a “corporal substance” (al-ǧawhar al-ǧusmānī) and the “intelligi-
ble” (al-maʿqūl), “the form occuring in the soul” (aṣ-ṣūra al-ḥāṣila fī n-nafs)120, 
also called “the image of the perceived” (miṯāl al-maḥsūs)121. This distinction 
appears to be important in another discussion of Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, namely in his 
commentary on Aristotle, Cat. 2. 1 a 16 — 1 b 9, on the qualities of substance and 
accident122. How can the form be part and not accident of what is composed of 
form and matter? What is the relation between accident and its substrate? In his 
report on the different solutions, which partly are mirrored in the Alexandrian 
commentaries, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib tends to assume a similarity between the being of the 
accident and the being of the form in the substrate. Because accidents require the 
perceivable matter (hayūla qarība “near matter”) as a substrate, which is composed 
of matter and its accident “form”123, Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib can declare the whole and its 
parts as identical; the form becomes the composition of all its parts and thus makes 
its substrate, the matter, perceivable124. Here, we must pay attention to the interde-
pendence of form, matter and accident. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib illustrates this with his exam-
ple of the aroma/smell of an apple, which, according to him, shapes the surrounding 
air, and the form of this shaped air will be imprinted in our senses. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib 
refutes other proposals, which he found in the Alexandrian commentaries125 and 
remarkably declares the imprint of the air in the senses to be a “spiritual” (rūḥānī) 
imprint, different from the “bodily” (ǧusmānī) imprint of the form in the matter126. 
As Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib considers the imprints in the air and subsequently in the senses as 
substrates with corresponding forms, his proposal is not very distant from the expla-
nation attributed to Plotinus, according to which the smell of the apple is a substance 
and not an accident127. Even the second solution, according to which the bodily 
vapour of the smell is dissolved and then shapes the air, is similar to the proposal 
attributed to Plotinus and ascribed to him by Olympiodorus128.
The allusion to Plotinus and the classification of sense perceptions, like the 
smell of an apple, as a “spiritual” imprint in the senses, in my opinion does not 
allow an explanation from the background of Aristotle’s doctrine of sense-percep-
tion (De anima, book B 419 a), as has been proposed129 under the impression of 
Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib himself, who attributed his solution to the school of Aristotle130. In 
my opinion we should have a look in another direction, in the Stoic discussion of 
“relation” and its transcendental aspects. Its echo in Neoplatonic philosophy 
became influential in the 10th century, in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity and 
120. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 285, 28-32.
121. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 285, 31
122. Ed. Ferrari, 2006: 55-69. Cf. the article by Ferrari, 2004 (the pages 92-105 are nearly identical 
with the pages 63-74 in Ferrari, 2006).
123. Ferrari, 2004: 94f.
124. Cf. Ferrari, 2004: 96.
125. Cf. Ferrari, 2004: 98-103.
126. Ferrari, 2004: 100
127. Ferrari, 2004: 98; cf. 98 and 102f.
128. Ferrari, 2004: 103.
129. Ferrari, 2004: 104.
130. Ferrari, 2004: 100.
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their classification of the intellect as mediator between God and human soul131. As 
has been shown in a monograph from the year 1986132, the Stoics detected the 
“relation” as a universal valid category, in which all single entities are connected 
in the totality of all things. This totality of all things is the cosmos, which is pen-
etrated by the pneuma, the hegemonikon, the tonos, that determines the dynamic 
process of interaction. The Stoic concept of the immanence of the pneuma, the 
divine dynamic and continuous medium, is mirrored in the Stoic doctrine of the 
interpenetration of all substances, of the total mixture of matter and pneuma133. 
This interpenetration of all substances became important for the Stoic theory of 
the relations of “place” (prerequesites of quantitive and qualitative identity, simi-
larity and dissimilarity), “time” and movement as well as “action” and “pas-
sion”134: Because of their universality these relations were considered as primary 
structures, which were object of thought and perceivable in a dynamic and time-re-
lated process of realization, the physis in the relatives, the secondary things135. As 
these secondary things, the beings, were dynamic processes, they can only be the 
object of a propositional logic, in which names and concepts remain incomplete 
statements136. Their primary structure of “relation” is something transcendental137, 
which, as determining norm of all single realizations, becomes the logos and in the 
unity beyond the objective reality the divine nous138. Consequently, in this theory 
of “relation”, the “relation” appears to be the form, the primary structure of differ-
ent relata, which correspond to this form139.
Only spolia of this Stoic concept of “relation” did enter Islamic philosophy, 
namely through the mediation of Neoplatonism, in which the Stoic immanence of 
the divine dynamic medium, the pneuma, is replaced by a concept of the divine 
One, who as divine intellect is both — immanent and transcendent140. Here, two 
aspects become important in the Islamic period: The role of reason and intellect in 
the reflexion on the category of “relation” and the emanation of the divine intellect 
determining the concept of “relation” created in the human soul. We mentioned 
Ibn Ḥazm, the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, who possibly 
were inspired by some Alexandrian Neoplatonizing commentators of Aristotle141.
We shall consider now the place of the great philosophers Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and 
Ibn Rušd between philosophical linguistic and metaphysical interpretations of the 
“relation”. Here, the texts which we have discussed so far, will be a helpful back-
ground for their interpretations.
131. See above ch. 6, n. 103.
132. Löbl, 1986.
133. Alexander of Aphrodisias dedicated a work to this doctrine: see Todd, 1976, quoted by Löbl, 
1986: 120. 
134. Löbl, 1986: 120-129.
135. Löbl, 1986: 132.
136. Löbl, 1986: 132f.
137. Löbl, 1986: 134-141.
138. Löbl. 1986: 137.
139. Löbl, 1986: 129.
140. Cf. Daiber, 2015a: 9.
141. Cf. ἐνθύμημα, Olympiodorus, 1902: 55, 28; νοεῖται, Elias, 1900: 159, 15. — Cf. n. 50.
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8. Fa¯ra¯bı¯
Fārābī (258/872 — 339/950 or 951) seems to have been the first Muslim philosopher, 
who had written a word-by-word commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, which is 
classified as “Long commentary” (Tafsīr, Šarḥ). Only fragments are available in a 
Hebrew version, perhaps by Šemuel of Marseilles from the 14th century142. Regret-
tably, they do not contain Fārābī’s comments on the category of “relation”. Another 
treatise by Fārābī, his Book on the Categories (Kitāb Qāṭāġūriyās), is in fact an 
expanding version based on the Arabic translation by Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (died 910 or 
911 AD), and not a “paraphrase”143. It is a kind of preparatory work to Fārābī’s Book 
of Letters, Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, which we will discuss later. Fārābī mentions the main 
points of Aristotle, but in a slightly differing order, with new accentuations and with 
additions. The chapter on the relatives144 is followed by aspects, which were discussed 
by Aristotle separately on different places and which were studied by Fārābī as some-
thing referring to “relation”, namely “time”145 and “place”146. The last-mentioned 
category is followed in the Fārābī-text by sections on the categories “position”147, 
“possession”148, “passion” (an yanfaʿil) and “action” (an yafʿala)149. The complete 
sequence corresponds to Aristotle.150 Fārābī, however, does not consider “position”, 
“possession”, “passion” and “action” as belonging to the category “relation”, nor does 
he include “quantity”151 and “quality”152. The category “quality”, according to him, 
can be confused with “relation”, because of its ambiguity with regard to genus and 
142. Ed. and translated by Zonta, 2006.
143. Cf. the edition and translation by Dunlop, 1957/1959. The Arabic text can also be found in Fārābī, 
1985 (ed. Rafīq al-ʿAǧam) and 1987 (ed. Muḥammad Taqī Dānišpažūh).
144. Ed./transl. Dunlop, 1957/1959: §§ 21-28; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 7. An excerpt from the section on 
relation can be found in Ibn Bāǧǧa’s (ca 488/1095 — 532/1138 or 533/1139), 1994: 91, 13-17 (= 
Fārābī, ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 182, 4-8). The following passage in Ibn Bāǧǧa, 1994: 91, 17 - 92, 
15, does not exist in Fārābī and is not part of the “exercise” (irtiyāḍ) on the relation (Ibn Bāǧǧa, 
1994: 115, 4 - 116, 15). Both passages add more examples. Further excerpts from Fārābī are in 
Ibn Ṭumlūs’ (559/1164 - 620/1223) Kitāb al-Madḫal li-ṣināʿat al-manṭiq (Ibn Ṭumlūs, 1916); the 
section on relation: 56-59. Sometimes Ibn Ṭumlūs inserts a nearly literal quotation from Fārābī’s 
paraphrase (ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 179, 15 = Ibn Ṭumlūs, 1916: 56, 6f; ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 
181, 11 = Ibn Ṭumlūs, 1916: 57, 9f.; ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 182, 4f. = Ibn Ṭumlūs, 1916: 58, 
13f.) and continues with his own illustrating examples, partly introduced by miṯla ḏālika or 
wa-ḏālika miṯla. At the beginning, after having quoted Fārābī’s definition of relation (Ibn Ṭumlūs, 
1916: 56, 6f.), Ibn Ṭumlūs adds the remark that Ibn Sīnā opposed (iʿtaraḍa) to Fārābī’s definition 
of relation, which, according to him, turned out to be correct. Regrettably, we are not informed 
about the details of difference according to him. On Ibn Ṭumlūs’ high estimation of Fārābī cf. 
Elamrani-Jamal, 1997; on Ibn Ṭumlūs as a critic of Fārābī cf. Ben Ahmed, 2016: 545-548.
145. §§ 29-31; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 12 and 13; as part of quantity Cat. 6. 5 b 5f.
146. §§ 32-33; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6. 6 a 12, as part of quantity.
147. §§ 34-35; cf. the short note in Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 10.
148. § 36 (Dunlop wrong “state”); cf. Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 13f.; 10. 12 a 26ff; 15. 15 b 18-32.
149. §§ 37-40; cf. the short note Aristotle, Cat. 9. 11 b 1-4.
150. Cat. 4. 1 b 26-28; the sections themselves in the following text keep to this sequence, with the 
exception of the sections on time (see n. 146) and place (see n. 147).
151. §§ 6-15; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6.
152. §§ 16-20; cf. Aristotle, Cat. 8.
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species153. According to Fārābī, the same ambiguity exists in “the other categories, 
for example “substance” (al-ǧawhar), “position” (al-waḍʿ)”, etc.154
This is the reason why Fārābī does not follow the Alexandrians and the school 
of Kindī, where the categories “substance” (Aristotle, Cat. 5), “quality” (Aristotle, 
Cat. 8), “quantity” (Aristotle, Cat. 6) and “relation” (Aristotle, Cat. 7) were con-
sidered as belonging to the “simple” part and as combinable with the “connective” 
categories “time”, “place”, “position”, “possession”, “passion” and “action”. In the 
section on the category “when” Fārābī explicitly dissociates himself from unnamed 
scholars (apparently the Alexandrians and the school of Kindī), who declare the 
meaning of “when” “as “time” (zamān) or as something composed from “substance” 
(ǧawhar) and “time”155. And in his Book on the Letters Fārābī criticizes unnamed 
scholars, who in differing manner declare kinds of “connections” (aṣnāf an-nisab) 
between things as “relation” (iḍāfa)156. Not everything that has a kind of connection 
with something else can be classified as “relation”. First indications of Fārābī’s own 
view we find in the mentioned Book on the Categories: Here, Fārābī mentions the 
“particles of connections” (ḥurūf an-nisab)157, which are “employed in referring 
each one (of the relatives) to the other” and he mentions the condition that essence 
(māhiya) and “existence” (wuǧūd) of the correlated things “have a certain kind of 
relation”. In addition, in the description (yūṣafu) of the “relation” the names (asmāʾ) 
should indicate the “essence” and “existence” of both relatives158. In case there are 
no generally accepted names (asmāʾ mašhūra)159, common people (al-ǧumhūr) in a 
careless and arbitrary way use names, which actually belong to another category and 
they add “particles of connection”160. Here, Fārābī adds chapters on the peculiarities 
(ḫawāṣṣ) of the “relation”, which should avoid confusion about the relation between 
two things: He mentions as conditions the “homogeneity in the speech” (at-takāfuʾ 
fī l-qawl) with regard to two relatives (“the son” is “the son of the father”)161; the 
simultaneousness of two relatives (wuǧūduhumā maʿan)162; the equality of the rel-
atives with regard to their genus, species or individuality163 and the existence of 
“generally accepted names” (al-asmāʾ al-mašhūra)164.
From this background we shall have a look at the section on “relation” in 
Fārābī’s Book of Letters (Kitāb al-Ḥurūf) where he clarifies and, above all, spec-
ifies his own position165:
153. Cf. ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 28, 182f.
154. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 28, 183.
155. Ed. Dunlop, 1959: § 29, 21, 3f. / transl. 37. On Fārābī’s dissociation from Kindī, cf. Thom, 2015: 
33f.
156. Cf. Fārābī, 1970: § 53.
157. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 21, 179, 19.
158. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 22, 180, 17-20.
159. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 23, 181, 8; cf. ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 27.
160. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 23, 180, 27 - 181, 10.
161. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 24, 181, 11f.
162. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 25, 181, 20.
163. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: §§ 26 and 27.
164. Ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: § 27, 182, 23; cf. above all § 23, ed. Dunlop, 1957/1959: 181, 8.
165. Fārābī, 1970: 85, 8 - 91, 11 (§§ 41-50).
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§ 41 (p. 85, 9). Each of two relatives is related to the other through one common 
notion (maʿnā), which simultaneously exists for each one. An example is two rela-
tives being Alif and Bāʾ: If that common notion is taken to be the letters “Alif 
until Bāʾ”, [thereby the letter Alif is related to Bāʾ]. If it is taken to be the letters 
“Bāʾ [until Alif]”, thereby the letter Bāʾ is related to Alif. That common notion is 
“relation” (iḍāfa). Through this each one of both can be said to be related to the 
other. That single notion is the way (ṭarīq) between the roof and the earth of the 
house, which is called descent (hubūṭ), if its beginning is taken from the roof and 
its ending (p. 85, 15) on the earth; and it is called ascent (ṣuʿūd), if its beginning is 
made from the earth and its ending the roof. There is no difference (in the notion), 
taken its two outermost points. Similarly, the two relatives are the outermost points 
of the relation, so that (the relation) one time can be taken from Alif to Bāʾ and the 
other time from Bāʾ to Alif.
§ 42. Some of the kinds of relation do not at all have a name (ism). Consequently, 
two relatives have no name insofar as they have that kind of relation. Thus, the 
names of both, which (p. 85, 20) indicate their essences, cannot be deduced from 
their being two relatives, so that they both could be used in the relation. (P. 86, 1) 
The notion of relation does not become evident in both.
Some (of the kinds of relation) have a name, if (that name) is taken for one of both 
(outermost points). (Some) have no name, if (that name) is taken for the other 
(outermost point), so that the name of that other (outermost point), which through 
the relation indicates its essence, could be used and (so that) the name of the first 
(outermost point), which indicates its (essence), (could be used), because it has 
that kind of relation. 
<Some (of the kinds of relation) have two names, of which each one (of the rela-
tives) indicates one of the two relatives, insofar as it has that (p. 86, 5) kind of 
relation>. Thus, the name (of the “relative”) indicating it insofar as it has that 
kind of relation, can be taken for both in the relation of each one to the other. To 
these (kinds of relation) belong (two relatives), of which the names differ from 
each other — for example “father” and “son”. To that belong (two relatives) that 
have two names, (each) derivable from something, like “the owner” (al-mālik) and 
the “owned” (al-mamlūk); to that belong (two relatives), where the name of the 
one can be derived from the other, like “the knower” (al-ʿalīm) and “the known” 
(al-maʿlūm); to that belong (two relatives), where the names of both are completely 
identical, like “the friend” and “the friend” (aṣ-ṣadīq), “the partner” (p. 86, 10) and 
“the partner” (aš-šarīk). In many things, that have two names, the speaker in a care-
less manner can take the one or each one in relation to the other and pertaining to 
the other, being indicated through the names of both, which indicate the very essen-
ce of both (muǧarrad ḏātayhimā). He does so, without taking the names of both 
(relatives), which give an indication of themselves, because of some kind of rela-
tion, through which each one could be related to the other — as we can say “the ox 
of Zayd”. For, neither the ox nor Zayd indicate a kind of relation, because of which 
the ox could be attributed (p. 86, 15) to Zayd. However, if we say “the ox, owned 
(by someone) — Zayd is his owner”, (the words) “owned” (al-mamlūk) and “the 
owner” (al-mālik) are the names of both, insofar they both have that kind of rela-
tion. “Zayd” is his name, which indicates the essence of what is related to him, but it 
De praedicamento relationis in philosophia arabica et islamica  Supplement Issue, 2018  453
does not indicate it, because he has this kind of relation. If we would say “so-and-so 
is the slave of Zayd, his master”, we would designate both with their names, which 
indicate both, because they both have this kind of relation. To the relatives belong 
two correlatives (al-mutaḍāyifāni), the genus of which is a name for each one of 
both, because they both possess the genus of the relation(ship), which they both 
have; they both do not possess a (common) name, because they both have some 
kind of relation(ship) belonging to that genus, (p. 87, 1) for example “knowledge” 
(al-ʿilm) and “the known” (al-maʿlūm). Thus, “knowledge” (al-ʿilm) is knowledge 
belonging to the “known” (al-maʿlūm) and the “known” (al-maʿlūm) is known as 
belonging to “knowledge” (al-ʿilm). The (different) kinds of knowledge do not 
have a name, because kinds of relation belong to them — of which knowledge is 
its genus — with the kinds of the known which is the genus of (the “relative”). An 
example (is) “grammar” (an-naḥw) and “rhetoric” (al-ḫaṭāba): With regard to that 
it is not possible to say: “The grammar is grammar of something which is known 
as “grammar”; however, if we want to relate grammar to something (p. 87, 5) from 
the known things of grammar, to which it (can) have a relation, we take (grammar) 
as something with the attribute of a genus and we say: “Grammar is knowledge of 
something (aš-šayʾ) which is known as grammar”.
§ 43. The condition of two relatives is, that each of them is taken as something, 
which is indicated by its name, which indicates it because it has that kind of rela-
tion. Therefore, Aristotle said: “Two relatives are those, which are found to be rela-
ted in some kind of relation”166. And therefore, (p. 87, 10) if we find in the language 
something related to something else through some particle (ḥarf) of relation or if 
the shape of (the two relatives) or of one of them is the shape of a “relative”, it is 
not appropriate to say: “They both are relatives, until their names indicate them, 
because they both have that kind of relation”. Then it is appropriate to say that they 
both are relatives.
§ 44. The general public, the orators (al-ḫuṭabāʾ) and the poets are careless and 
arbitrary in their expression. (P. 87, 15) Therefore, they declare each of both (relati-
ves), of which the one is said to be with regard (bi-l-qiyās) to the other, to be a rela-
tive: (These two relatives) exist through their names, which indicate them, because 
they have that kind of relation; or they exist through their names, which indicate 
their essences (ḏāt); or one of (both relatives) can be obtained through its name, 
which indicates its essence. Herewith, the “relative” can be described (yursamu) 
primarily, as the “relative” unhesitatingly has this description. Therefore, (p. 87, 
20) Aristotle described (the related) at the beginning of the chapter on the “relati-
ve” in his Book of the Categories, with the words: “About things it is maintained 
that they belong to the relatives, when their essences (māhiyātuhā) are maintained 
with regard to the other, in some manner of connection (nisba), whatever manner 
it is”167. (Aristotle) had in mind with his saying “their essences” what its expres-
sions (alfāẓuhā) indicate at any rate168 and generally. (The expression) indicates 
166. Cf. the beginning of the chapter on relation in Aristotle, Cat. 7. 6 a 36 / Arabic translation by Ibn 
Ḥunayn, 1980: 48, 8f. (not literally).
167. The quotation is a literal rendering (with few deviations, perhaps due to the transmission of 
Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Ḥurūf) of the Arabic translation by Ibn Ḥunayn, 1980: 48, 8-9 (= Aristotle, Cat. 
7. 6 a 36f.).
168. Read kayfamā instead of kayfa.
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(the essences), because (the essences) are kinds (p. 88, 1) of relation, belonging 
to them. Or, what is indicated through its expressions are its essences (ḏawātuhā). 
Therefore, as Aristotle was eager to outline the notions of the “relative”, from them 
necessarily resulted what is evident in (the situation) that the first description (by 
Aristotle169) is not (yet) a sufficient definition of the “relative”. — Then (Aristot-
le) allotted another description (rasm) to the “relative”170 and thus the notion of 
the “relative” is accomplished by that (description) as one single notion, which is 
reached through a definition (ḥadd)171 of the relatives, without any disturbance172.
§ 45 (p. 88, 5). These are the relatives, this is the relation, and these are the names 
that should be maintained with regard to the “relative” and the relation. All you 
hear, what the Arabic grammarians say about (the relatives) that they are related, 
belongs to the “relative” of which we mentioned the aspects that exist among the 
orators and poets and which correspond to the first (insufficient)173 description, that 
Aristotle applied to the “relative” in his book On Categories. They are, however, 
relatives (in which) the relator (al-muḍīf) is remiss or arbitrary in making (p. 88, 
10) one thing related to the other in an equal relation. This is not in accordance 
with <the second-mentioned>174 description, which Aristotle dedicated in that book 
to the “relative”. You should call the “relative” only what belongs to the second-
mentioned description. This is a relation, in which the one is related to the other 
in an equal relation.
§ 46 (p. 88, 15). The way to give an answer on “where is something?” is primarily 
by (mentioning) the “place” (al-makān) in connection with one of the relational 
particles, mostly with the particle “in” (fī), as we say: “Where is Zayd?”, whereupon 
it is answered: “In the house” or “in the market”. — The notion of these particles 
that precedes in the thought of man, is the relation of something to a place or to its 
place, which it has in particular (ḫāṣṣatan), either because of its kind (li-nawʿihī) or 
because of its genus (li-ǧinsihī). It seems that these particles can be transferred to all 
things, whenever in them a relation to the place can be imagined (tuḫayyal). As the 
place is enclosing and surrounding something and as the thing related to the place 
is surrounded by the place — thus the surrounded is surrounding the surrounded 
and the sourrounded (p. 89, 1) herewith is surrounded by the surrounding — the-
refore the place with this notion belongs to the “relative”. In addition, as Aristotle 
defined the place in his Physics175 and said “it is the limit of the sourrounding 
(nihāyat al-muḥīṭ)”, he made the surrounding a part of the definition of place and 
he made the essence (māhiya) (of the place) complete through its being surroun-
ding. Through its being (in(n)iyya/an(n)iyya) it is surrounding; the surrounding is 
169. Given at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7, see above.
170. In the sections following the introductory definition in Aristotle, Cat. 7.
171. On rasm and ḥadd cf. Abed, 1991: 35-59; and on the Alexandrian distinction between definition 
and description cf. Daiber, review in Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, 
142, 1992 (382-384), 383.
172. wa-lam yuḫalla. Cf. the expression fa-lā taḫtalla in Fārābī’s Kitāb Qāṭāġūriyās (ed. Dunlop, 
1957/1959: 181, 10).
173. See above § 43 in Fārābī’s text.
174. Fārābī means Aristotle’s detailed discussion after his first short and thus insufficient definition 
at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7; see above § 44 in Fārābī’s text.
175. Cf. Aristotle, Physics IV, ch. 4.
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surrounding that, what is surrounded and the surrounded by it is what (exists) in a 
place. If the notion (p. 89, 5) of our saying “in” is “surrounded”, then our saying 
“in” here indicates the relatives. Consequently, the answer to “where?” belongs to 
the relatives. Hence, “where” belongs to the relatives.
§ 47. However, if we do not mean with our saying “Zayd is in the house” that he is 
surrounded by the house — although in accordance with the definiton of the place 
he necessarily must be surrounded — and (if) we do not mean with our saying “in 
the house” this (kind) of relation, but another connection (nisba), which does not 
belong to (p. 89, 10) the relatives, in that case the category of “where” does not 
belong to the relatives and it happens to (that category) that it is (assigned) to the 
relatives not with respect to what the category “where” (normally) is and becau-
se herewith an answer is given upon the question “where?”. The meaning of the 
particle (ḥarf) “in” here becomes another connection (nisba), different from the 
connection of relation (nisbat al-iḍāfa). Now, if to that (connection) at the same 
time the connection of relation is attached, it has two kinds of connections with 
the place: One is appropriate for giving an answer upon (the question) “where?” 
and the other becomes through that (connection) a part of (p. 89, 15) the relation.
§ 48. However, for example in our saying “the ox of Zayd”, and “the slave (ġulām) 
of Zayd” someone could utter something that prevents (this connection) to have two 
connections, in one of which exists the name of each of both that indicates its essen-
ce (ḏāt). That does not belong to the relatives (al-muḍāf). It belongs to the relatives 
(al-muḍāf) (only), if of each one of both the description (rasm) is kept that indicates 
(the “relative”), because it has some kind of relation (iḍāfa) (p. 89, 20). In case it is 
not so and instead this and similar things are relatives, the expression of which is 
tolerated — how should our saying “Zayd is in the house” not be a “relative”, the 
expression of which is tolerated? If its expression is presented, then it could be said: 
“Zayd, who is surrounded by it, is in the house, which surrounds him” and then it 
would be clear that (this) belongs to the relatives. If our saying “this ox belongs 
to Zayd” and “this speech belongs to Zayd” do not receive two connections, <one 
connection that is not (p. 90, 1) a relation (iḍāfa) and> (another) connection, which 
is indicated in our saying “this ox which is owned by Zayd who possesses him” 
— then the connected in that first connection, which is not a relation (iḍāfa) has a 
relation in another respect and in addition even or saying “this ox belongs to Zayd” 
from the beginning can be made a relation, the expression of which is tolerated, 
relying (ittikālan) on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and on (the fact) 
that only the possession of Zayd can be understood from it. (P. 90, 5) How can, in 
addition, our saying “Zayd is in the house” apriori not be made a relation, which is 
tolerated in its expression, relying on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and 
(on the fact) that only he is surrounded by the house. Consequently, the meaning of 
the particle (ḥarf) “in” is apriori the surrounding (al-iḥāṭa).
§ 49. We say: This is correct — I mean: Zayd is surrounded by the house and the 
house is surrounding Zayd. Both are relatives, whenever both are taken (uḫiḏā) in 
this way. However, that with regard to what we maintain (p. 90, 10) a connection 
(nisba), consists of two kinds: One kind is one common notion (maʿnā) between 
two (things), namely its two outermost parts (ṭarafāhu), of which each of both is 
understood as beginning and the other as the end. Sometimes, this can be made a 
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beginning and that an end, so that this can be said between two (things); even more: 
It is only from one (side) of both to the other, so that one of both is the beginning 
and not the other and that other is the end and not the first. It is not possible to 
understand the other as beginning with exactly that notion. On the contrary, the first 
can only be said to be something with regard to the second. This (p. 90, 15) can be 
called “connection” (an-nisba) particularly and that (other) can be specified with 
the name “relation” (al-iḍāfa). With this kind only one of both can be described 
and (this one) only has (this kind of relation), because this and not the other can be 
attributed to it (maḥmūl ʿalayhi). If that other occurs simultaneously with it and is a 
part by which the attribute (al-maḥmūl) is completed — in our saying “Zayd is the 
father of ʿAmr” “ʿAmr” occurs simultaneously with “the father” because he is an 
attributive part (ǧuzʾ maḥmūl), and in our saying “ʿAmr, the son of Zayd” “Zayd” 
occurs simultaneously with “the son”, because (p. 90, 20) he is an attributive part 
(ǧuzʾ maḥmūl) — then each of both is at times an object (mawḍūʿ) and at times 
an attributive part, if both are taken as two relatives. In our saying “Zayd is in the 
house” “the house” is an attributive part and we cannot make “Zayd” an attributive 
part176 of the house with the meaning of what we said about Zayd that he is “in the 
house”. (P. 91, 1) However, if we say “the house is the possession of Zayd”, then 
“Zayd” is the attributive part177 with the meaning different from the first (case). 
This comprises the “where”, the “when” and “that it belongs to him”.
§ 50. These two kinds are the two kinds of a connection (nisba), because it is a 
common name, in which does not exist the condition that is peculiar to each of 
both kinds. However, (the common name) is understood in an absolute manner, 
namely as a connection (an-nisba), (p. 91, 5) which includes each of both kinds and 
which includes the “where”, the “when” and the “belonging to him”. (What has a 
common name, can) differ, according to the different genera, which the connection 
(an-nisba) can come across. The one does not fall under the other: Neither “place” 
(falls) under “time”, nor “time” under “place”, nor the clothing under one of both 
(mentioned). For, the clothing is a body laid around the body, which is connected 
with it; “place” is not a body, but the surface and the limit of a body; “time” is 
remote from clothes. The fact that each of (p. 91, 10) these things with connection 
(al-ašyāʾ al-mansūba), which we can reckon among the category of the relatives, 
should not make us doubt the relation attached to it. The relation can be attached 
to every other category178.
The translated text gives rise to the following observations:
The examples, which were used by Fārābī, were taken from Aristotle (examples 
of father – son179, slave – master180, knower – known181) and in one case can be 
traced to the Alexandrians (friend – friend182) and to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (partner – 
176. al-ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūla. The edition of Mahdi has instead ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūli “part of the attributed”.
177. al-ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūla. The edition of Mahdi has instead ǧuzʾa l-maḥmūli “part of the attributed”.
178. The ms. has al-maʿqūlāt “intelligibila” instead of al-maqūlāt “categories”.
179. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 49.
180. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 48.
181. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
182. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
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partner)183. These examples and Fārābīs own examples (house184, owner – own 
with the example ox – Zayd185, speech186, grammar187, Zayd the father of ʿAmr188) 
were interpreted by Fārābī in a manner that differs considerably from Aristotle and 
his commentators.
 He introduced three factors, which he selected from Aristotle and which, 
according to him, solely can determine a “relation”, namely “time”, “place” and 
“possession”. 
In addition189, he distinguished between the “relation” (iḍāfa) in the true sense 
of the word (because of its “kind” or its “genus”190) and the connection (nisba)191, 
which in arbitrary use of the language by the “general public”, “orators” and 
“poets” wrongly might be considered as real relation192.
He introduced the “particles of relation”, i.e. prepositions like “in”, as an addi-
tional indication of a real relation193. A real and complete relation in “Zayd in the 
house” is the notion that Zayd is surrounded by the house. The relation is “sur-
rounding” (iḥāṭa)194.
He defined relation as a “way” (ṭarīq) between two outermost points, in case 
of the roof of a house built on the ground Fārābī speaks of “descent” from the roof 
and “ascent” from the ground. As in the definition of the preposition “in” in “Zayd 
in the house” relation appears here to be determined by the state of “surrounding” 
and not by the relatives and their essences.
In this sense, Fārābī considered besides “place” also “time” and “possession” 
as states of relation. Simultaneousness of “time” appears in the example of “Zayd 
is the father of ʿAmr”195, in addition it is evident in the examples of two friends 
and two companions; moreover, the example of “grammar (which) is knowledge 
of something which is known as gammar”: Here, knowledge (ʿilm) is a relation 
qua genus, a generic state of relation between grammar and what is known 
(maʿlūm) as grammar196. The relation of “possession”, its state of relation, is exem-
plified by the examples “the ox of Zayd”, “the speech of Zayd”, “the slave of 
Zayd”197 and “the house owned by Zayd”198.
183. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
184. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 41, 46, 47, 48.
185. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 48.
186. Fārābī, 1970: § 48.
187. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
188. Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
189. Cf. the conclusion Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
190. Fārābī, 1970: § 46. Cf. Abed, 1991: 11-15. The genus as factor of a real relation can also be found 
in a fragment of the Aristotelian Categories in the Kitāb al-aḥǧār attributed to Ǧābir (see above 
ch. 4).
191. Cf. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 47, 48.
192. Cf. Fārābī, 1970: § 44.
193. Cf. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 43, 46, 47, 48, 49.
194. Fārābī, 1970: § 48 end.
195. Fārābī, 1970: § 49.
196. Fārābī, 1970: § 42.
197. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 42, 48.
198. Fārābī, 1970: § 49 end.
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Fārābī’s discussion of relation bears witness to his endeavour, to give a clear 
definition of relation and “relative” and the names used for both. He refers to 
Aristotle’s statement at the beginning of Cat. 7, which he found an insufficient 
description that Aristotle is said to have supplemented with his subsequent descrip-
tions. On this occasion, Fārābī’s text stresses the necessity of a clear and unmis-
takable (“without any disturbance”) definition (ḥadd) of the relative things, leading 
to a uniform (“one single”) notion199. Fārābī here is criticizing the “general public, 
the orators and the poets”, moreover the “grammarians”, who were “remiss and 
arbitrary” in their expressions, who restrict themselves to the still insufficient 
description of relation at the beginning of Aristotle, Cat. 7 and who claim to relate 
things to each other in an “equal relation”200. In his quotation from Aristotle, Cat. 
7, Fārābī could explain Aristotle’s term “essences” (māhiyāt) of the relations as 
“what their expressions indicate at any rate and generally”201.
However, at the same time Fārābī seems to be aware that the meaning of an 
expression is also “something what is in the mind of the listener”202 and that expres-
sions might be used in an arbitrary way203. This remark is an indication that Fārābī’s 
discussion of the category “relation” with the aspects of “place”, “time” and “pos-
session” and its classification as a state between two outermost points evolves to 
be an essential element in his theory of communication. This is not yet fully elab-
orated in an article by the late Stéphane Diebler204, who analysed Fārābī’s doctrine 
of categories as part of Fārābī’s theory of communication, in which Aristotles Cate-
gories are combined with Aristotle’s art of scientific demonstration (Analytica pos-
teriora), Aristotle’s dialectic (Topica), his sophistic art (Sophistical Refutations), 
Rhetoric and Poetics. Fārābī integrated his theory of communication in his doctrine 
of the ideal state and its ruler, who must be a philosopher and teacher with intellec-
tual qualities necessary for communication and teaching205 his subjects, and for 
gaining increasing knowledge, inspired by the divine active intellect206.
Fārābī’s theory of communication presupposes a concept of language, which 
becomes clear in his discussion of relation: Language is conditional on descriptions 
and definitions, which are the constituents of relations between relatives; relations 
are correlated to “time”, “place” and “possession”; their linguistic tool are the 
199. See Fārābī, 1970: § 44.
200. Cf. Fārābī, 1970: §§ 44, 45.
201. Fārābī, 1970: § 44, 87, 22f.
202. Fārābī, 1970: § 48, 90, 3 and 6.
203. See above § 45 in Fārābī’s text.
204. In his innovative article Diebler, 2005: 275-305, esp. 286-290. The article contains on 295-305 
a list of the topics of Fārābī’s “Book of Letters”, his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf.
205. Fārābī’s method of instruction, described in his Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala fī l-manṭiq (1968: 
87, 11ff.; cf. Daiber, 1986b: 8) is alluded to in Fārābī’s Long Commentary on Aristotle’s Cate-
gories (fragments are preserved in a Hebrew version perhaps by Šemuel of Marseilles in the 14th 
century), see translation by Zonta, 2006: 202f.
206. Cf. Daiber, 1986b: 135f., with reference to Aristotle’s Organon, esp. his Analytica posteriora; 
Daiber, 2007 and 2010. Cf. also Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt, 428-433 / 
English version: 616-621 (on Fārābī’s Neoplatonic concept of emanations from the divine intel-
lect); and 434-447 / English version: 622-636.
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socalled “particles” (ḥurūf), e.g. the preposition “in”, which herewith are not 
restricted to a grammatical function. They have mainly a logical function and 
simultaneously they create the context for descriptions and definitions, for the 
correct understanding of the meaning of “expressions” (alfāẓ) and herewith for 
the communication. In this manner, Fārābī gives a clear indication of his own 
standpoint in the discussion (which might have been known to Fārābī)207 from 
932 AD between Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender of logic as a universal 
valid vehicle of intelligible things, and the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a 
defender of language as only access to intelligible things208. Fārābī dissociates 
himself from the grammarians, whom he criticizes for their arbitrary use of 
expressions209 and he favours the exact descriptions and definitions in the use of 
categories (including “relation”, “time”, “place” and “possession”). As Fārābī 
elsewhere explains210, the sensible objects (mušār ilayhi), our statements 
(maqūlāt) and our thinking (maʿqūl “what is conceived in the intellect”, the “intel-
ligible”) are interrelated. Fārābī apparently was followed by Abū Bišr’s pupil 
Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī211, who identified logic with universal grammar that is behind 
any particular language212. Fārābī tried to reconciliate grammar and logic; both 
are interrelated and require each other213.
In view of his borrowings from Neoplatonic emanational thought, especially 
in his doctrine of the divine intellect214, we should expect some impact of Fārābī’s 
metaphysics on his concept of “relation”. This seems not to be the case, and Fārābī 
remains to be heavily indebted to Aristotle’s Organon. His thesis of an interrelation 
between grammar and logic is based on the interrelation of language and 
thought215, which in the person of the ruler of the perfect state gets inspirations 
from the divine intellect216. There are no Stoic-Neoplatonic tendencies, as we find 
207. Cf. Versteegh, 1997: 78. Fārābī is said to have studied grammar with Ibn as-Sarrāǧ (d. 316/928), 
the teacher of as-Sīrāfī, and Ibn as-Sarrāǧ himself is said to have studied logic and music with 
Fārābī.
208. See above ch. 6.
209. On this cf. Versteegh, 1997: 76f., with a quotation from Fārābī’s Kitāb al-Alfāẓ al-mustaʿmala 
fī l-manṭiq (Fārābī, 1968: 41-43), according to which Fārābī criticizes unnamed grammarians, 
who recognize only those meanings of grammatical categories, which were used by the general 
public, not by logicians. On the deficiencies of Arabic grammarians since Sībawayh, whose 
classifictions of the parts of speech were insufficient according to Fārābī cf. Versteegh, 1997: 84.
210. Cf. the references given by Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 414f. / English 
version: 601f., and the article by Druart, 2007.
211. On the teacher-student-relationship between Fārābī and Yaḥyā Ibn ʿAdī cf. Endress in Philosophie 
in der islamischen Welt I, 304f. / English version: 440f.; Versteegh, 1997: 60f.
212. See above ch. 6.
213. The rules of grammar guarantee a correct expression of a particular nation and logic creates 
universal rules valid for the expressions of all nations: Versteegh, 1997: 86.
214. Cf. Rudolph in Philosophie in der islamischen Welt I, 427-434 / English version: 615-622.
215. Cf. Daiber, 1986b: 8f.
216. Cf. Daiber, 1986b: 15f. In view of this, it appears to be worthwhile to investigate Fārābī’s concept 
of being (mawǧūd), including the interrelation of language and thought, not only as something 
shaped by Aristotle’s Metaphysics (thus Menn, 2008), but also from the background of the Neo-
platonic hierarchy of emanations from the divine cause and active intellect and from the back-
ground of the intelligibles, which include the being as “second intelligible” (al-maʿqūl aṯ-ṯānī; 
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them in the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity217 or in Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib218. Fārābī and 
the discussions in his time about the relation of grammar and logic prepared the 
ground for the concept of a “mental logic” (al-manṭiq al-fikrī), mirrored in any 
language — thus the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity. Moreover, reason and 
intellect begin to rate high in the reflexion on the category of “relation”, as we saw 
in Ibn Ḥazm219.
9. Ibn Sı¯na¯
Now we turn to the perhaps greatest Islamic philosopher after Fārābī, to Ibn Sīnā 
(370/980 - 428/1037). He was acquainted with Fārābī’s thought and he developed 
different accentuations. Ibn Sīnā had a critical attitude towards the placing of the 
Categories in the logical section of his encyclopaedia aš-Šifāʾ220: He had some 
doubts about the value of the Categories for the student of logic and therefore he 
did not extensively discuss them in the logic sections of his books an-Naǧāt221, 
al-Ḥikma al-ʿArūḍiyya222, al-Mašriqiyūn, al-Išārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt, ʿUyūn 
al-ḥikma223 and al-Hidāya224. Nevertheless, he devoted to them a separate discus-
sion in his encyclopaedia aš-Šifāʾ225 and in the earlier written al-Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ 
fī l-manṭiq226. In his al-Muḫtaṣar Ibn Sīnā mainly follows the contents of Aristo-
tle227, including moderate criticisms directed against some traditions of Aristotle’s 
commentators, esp. Simplicius228. At the end of the short section on the “relative” 
(al-muḍāf)229 he lists the 10 categories “substance” (ǧawhar), “quantity” (kamm), 
“quality” (kayf), “relative”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” 
and “passion” and adds that the “relative”, according to its nature, concerns all of 
them230. This and its echo in Ibn Sīnā’s Dānish nāmeh231 appears to be further 
developed in Ibn Sīnā’s aš-Šifāʾ, Maqūlāt: Here he describes a modified division 
 
cf. Menn, 2008: 81). On a possible role of Simplicius’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories in 
Fārābī’s neoplatonizing doctrine of the intelligibles and the soul cf. Chase, 2008: 17-19. 
217. Cf. above ch. 6. 
218. See above ch. 7.
219. See above ch. 6.
220. Ibn Sīnā, 1959: 143, 15f.; for the details see Kalbarczyk, 2012: 320f.; Thom, 2015: 38.
221. Ibn Sīnā, 1985: Fakhry: 116, 4 - 117, 22 / English translation by Ahmed, 2012: 120-123 (on 
relation see 121).
222. On these two books, their comparison with al-Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq and his aš-Šifā’ cf. 
Eichner, 2013: 64-85.
223. Ibn Sīnā, 1954: 2, 17 - 3, 9 (the 10 categories ǧawhar, kammiyya, kayfiyya, iḍāfa, ayna, matā, 
al-waḍʿ, al-milk, an yafʿala šayʾun, an yanfaʿila šayʾun).
224. Ibn Sīnā, 1974: 71-76.
225. Ibn Sīnā, 1959.
226. Edited by Kalbarczyk, 2012: 326-349.
227. See Kalbarczyk, 2012: 351.
228. Cf. Kalbarczyk, 2012: 313-320.
229. Ed. Kalbarczyk, 2012: 338f.
230. On this cf. also Lizzini, 2013: 175, n. 45.
231. Cf. the figure in Thom, 2015: 45.
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of the categories which, according to him, is “widely accepted” and which corre-
sponds to a Latin paraphrase from the 4th century, attributed to Augustine but 
possibly composed or translated by a follower of Themistius232. As recently Paul 
Thom tried to show233, this modified division is elaborated by Ibn Sīnā to a com-
plex system on the assumption of a relationship to an external thing and on the 
basis of dichotomous divisions, for example the division of non-relational acci-
dents into those that involve an internal relationship of the subject’s parts and those 
that do not involve this. Non-relational accidents that do not involve an internal 
relationship of the subject’s parts, either involve number (= “quantity”) or do not 
(= “quality”). As elaborated by Thom, Ibn Sīna modifies the common assumptions 
about the categories “position”, “action”, “passion” and “possession”234 and con-
trasts the category “substance” with the accidental categories, which are divided 
into “quantity” and “quality” on the one side and “relative”, “where”, “when”, 
“action”, “passion”, “position” and “possession” (the last is mentioned with some 
doubts) on the other side235. The mentioned seven categories depend on compari-
son, the category of relatives is related to the intrinsic nature of the subject and the 
six remaining to something extrinsic236. We mention an example given by Ibn 
Sīnā237. It discusses the relationship between a man in the house and this house: 
Ibn Sīnā argues that an additional word between “man” and “the house”, namely 
“the owner of” creates a relationship between “man” and “house”. Here, the 
“intrinsic nature”238 of the subject “man/owner” points at the same time to some-
thing extrinsic, the “house”. 
Already Fārābī used this example239: He used grammar and additional particles 
and distinguished between “the house owned by Zayd” and “the house surrounding 
Zayd” (= Zayd in the house). However, the relationship is neither something intrin-
sic of the inhabitant of the house nor something extrinsic depending on the house; 
it is something, the expression of which is tolerated, “relying on what is in the mind 
(ḍamīr) of the listener and relying on (the fact) that only the “possession” (or the 
habitation) “of Zayd can be understood from it”240.
Here, we realize a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological. 
The ontological level is existing as well in Ibn Sīnā’s Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt241 and has 
affected Ibn Sīnā’s concept of homonymy, which Aristotle mentioned at the begin-
ning of his Categories (1. 1 a 1-6)242. The ontological level is further developed 
232. Cf. Thom, 2015: 36f.
233. Thom, 2015: 37-49.
234. Cf. Thom, 2015: 42-45.
235. Thom, 2015: 44f.
236. Thom, 2015: 45.
237. Ibn Sīnā, 1959: 144, 11f. / translated and commented by Thom, 2015: 46.
238. I follow the terminology of Thom, 2015.
239. See above ch. 8, Fārābīʾs Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, 1970: §§ 46-49. Further examples, used by Ibn Sīnā 
(1959: 145), are also inspired by Fārābī.
240. Cf. above ch. 8, Fārābī, 1970: § 48, end.
241. E.g. Ibn Sīnā, 1959: 145, 7-12; cf. Lizzini, 2013: 174. 
242. Cf. Bäck, 2008: esp. 54-64.
462  Enrahonar. Supplement Issue, 2018 Hans Daiber
in Ibn Sīnā’s Šifāʾ, Metaphysics, in the chapter on relatives243. This chapter is an 
elaboration of the section on “relation” in Aristotle’s Metaphysics V 15. 1020 b 26 
- 1021 b 10. In this elaboration Ibn Sīnā declares the “relation” (iḍāfa) to be based 
on some “notion” (maʿnā)244 in one of the two relatives (muḍāfāt), e.g. in the 
asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the relation fatherhood, which 
Ibn Sīnā called “notion” or “description of its existence” (waṣf wuǧūdihī), of its 
“being with respect to something else in the father”245. Because of this “descrip-
tion” the “relative” has its external existence246; the “definition” (ḥadd) of the 
“relative” “in its existence” (fī l-wuǧūd) makes of the “relative” an accident 
(ʿaraḍ)247, “which has the mentioned description (i.e. fatherhood al-abuwwa248), 
when it is in the intellect apprehended (ʿuqila)”249. 
Consequently, Ibn Sīnā distinguished between “intellectual relation” (al-iḍāfa 
al-ʿaqliyya) and “existential relation” (al-iḍāfa al-wuǧūdiyya)250; the “existential 
relation”, the existence of the “relative” in concrete things (al-aʿyān) exists, 
according to Ibn Sīnā. However, the “intellectual relation” must not always have 
a corresponding relation in existence251. He argues: “It is possible to have invent-
243. Ed. and transl. by Marmura, cf. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 116-123. An earlier version of the translation, 
with commentary, is Marmura, 1975. In the medieval Latin tanslation from the 12th century and 
made in Toledo, we find this chapter (Capitulum de ad alquid) in the edition by Riet, 1977: 173-
183. It became an inspirative source e.g. for Henry of Ghent (13th c.): cf. Decorte, 2002b: esp. 
321f., and his earlier articles: Decorte, 2001: esp. 59-64; 1995; and 2002a. On relation in medi-
eval philosophy cf. Weinberg, 1965; Henninger, 1989; Mojsisch, 1992; Schönberger, 1994; 
Brower, 2001.
244. Marmura translates “idea”.
245. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 118, 8-17, esp. l1-14. 
246. Cf. also Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 120, 14 - 121, 18; the section 120, 14 - 121, 8 is excerpted in the Istan-
bul Ms. Aya Sofya 4855 (copied 733/1333), fols. 71r, 12 - 71v, 8 and begins with “the Sheikh 
said in his books”. The excerpt is followed by a commentary (fols. 71v, 8 - 72r, 2), beginning 
with waʿlam ann ḥāṣila l-ǧawābi huwa anna l-abuwwata maṯalan mawṣūfatun bi-iḍāfatin uḫrā.
247. Perhaps an inspiration and elaboration of Aristotle, Metaph. 1021 b 8f., where Aristotle declares 
the human being to be a relative in an accidental manner, because an accident of a human being 
is his being a double of another human being. Accordingly, Ghazālī mentions in his Maqāṣid 
al-falāsifa, “Doctrines of the philosophers” (on the translation of maqāṣid cf. Shihadeh, 2011: 
90-92) — a description of Ibn Sīnāʾs doctrines — “relation” (iḍāfa) among the “accidents” 
(aʿrāḍ) together with “quantity”, “quality”, “place”, “time”, “position”, “possession”, “action” 
and “passion” (see also Ghazālī, Miʿyār al-ʿilm, 1961: 107, 13 - 108, 4) and explains it as “a state 
(ḥāla) of the substance (ǧawhar), which occurs because of something different opposite to it. 
For example fatherhood (al-abuwwa), sonship (al-banuwwa), brotherhood (al-aḫuwwa), friend-
ship (aṣ-ṣadāqa), neighbourhood (al-muǧāwara) and consanguinity (muwāfāt?; cf. Dānišnāma), 
or its being on the right or left side, since fatherhood is only because of the father, insofar a son 
is opposite to him”: See Ghazālī, 2008: 79, 12-14. The text is based on Ibn Sīnāʾs Dānišnāma, 
1973b: 26, and the echo in Ramon Llull’s Compendium Logicae Algazelis, who mixed the text 
with Petrus Hispanus, Summulae logicales, see ed. Lohr, 1967: 113 and on the sources 27f.; and 
the correct remark on the Maqāṣid (Lohr, 1967: 40): “Eine intelligente Umarbeitung von Ibn 
Sīnās Dānišnāma”. As Lohr has shown, Llull’s text is based on the Arabic and independent from 
the medieval Latin translation, on which cf. now Minnema, 2014 (on Llull: 170).
248. Cf. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 121, 5-6.
249. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 122, 5-7.
250. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 122, 5-12; cf. Lizzini, 2013: 192f.
251. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 122, 13-15.
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ed relations (iḍāfāt muḫtaraʿa) in the intellect by reason of the special property the 
intellect has with respect of them”252.
In aš-Šifāʾ, al-Maqūlāt Ibn Sīnā follows the same ontological line, when he 
declares that the conception (taṣawwur) of the notion (maʿnā) of something requires 
the conception of the notion of something outside, as for example the conception 
of the notion of the roof requires simultaneously the conception of the notion of the 
wall, although the quiddity (māhiya) of the roof is not predicated in relationship 
with (bi-l-qiyās ilā) the wall253.
In the same manner Ibn Sīnā could, with regard to the example of father and 
son, formulate an asymmetrical relation: “The relation (of the father) to fatherhood 
(al-abuwwa) — which is the description of (the father) — is in the father alone. 
However, (the description) belongs only to the father with respect to another thing 
in the father. And his being with respect to the other (thing) does not make him 
exist in the other. Because fatherhood is not in the son. […]. Rather fatherhood is 
in the father. The case is similar with the state (ḥāl) of the son with respect to the 
father. There is nothing at all which is in both of them. Here, we have nothing but 
fatherhood or sonship. As for a state (ḥāla) posited for [both] fatherhood and 
sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”254. 
Ibn Sīnā’s student Bahmanyār Ibn Marzubān did not follow this idea and was 
not aware of Ibn Sīnā’s discussion of the particular relation of father and son ver-
sus relation related to the species father and son, i.e. particular multiplicity versus 
the oneness of one notion (maʿnā wāḥid), namely “humanity” (insāniyya): cf. Ibn 
Sīnā, 2005, Šifāʾ, Metaphysics: 247, 17 - 248, 1; with Bahmanyār, 1970, at-Taḥṣīl: 
31, 1-3: “(To the categories) belongs the relation, which is a notion (maʿnā), which 
in case of its existence or mental conception is definitely conceived in the mind 
(maʿqūl) with respect to something different and together with this. It has no other 
existence — just as fatherhood (al-abuwwa) with respect to sonship (al-banuwwa) 
and not like a father who has another existence different from him (and preceding 
him). This (notion of relation) is “humanity”.
However, this statement, based on the distinction between real and mental 
relation in Ibn Sīnā255, seems to be an echo of summarizing remarks or discus-
sions in two other works by Ibn Sīnā, his Kitāb an-Naǧāt256 and his at-Taʿlīqāt257. 
An echo of these discussions can be found in Zayn ad-Dīn ʿUmar Ibn Sahlān 
as-Sāwī (from Sāwa between Ray and Hamadan; d. 450/1058), al-Baṣāʾir 
an-Naṣīriyya fī ʿilm al-manṭiq, ed. Rafīq al-ʿAǧam, annotated by Muḥammad 
ʿAbduh258. The concept of a mental relation (iʿtibārāt ʿaqliyya, mulāḥaẓāt 
252. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 122, 11f; cf. Lizzini, 2013: 191.
253. Cf. Ibn Sīnā, 1959: 145, 7-12 and Lizzini, 2013: 174; Ibn Sīnā, 1959: 146, 2-15; Lizzini, 2013: 
171.
254. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 118, 13-17; and Marmura’s remarks, Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 413, n. 8 and 9. 
255. Cf. on this Zghal, 2006. Worthwhile mentioning is the discussion in Faḫraddīn ar-Rāzī, 1990: 
560-563.
256. See Ibn Sīnā, 1985: 116, 19-21, partly literal; cf. translation by Ahmed, 2012: 121.
257. See Ibn Sīnā, 1973: 94, 8 - 95, 4; 96, 25-28; 143-144; 146, 3-14.
258. See Sāwī, 1993: 65, 16 - 68, ult.; ch. 8.
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ʿaqliyya) is defended in Šihāb ad-Dīn Yaḥyā Ibn Ḥabaš Ibn Amīrak as-Suhrawardī’ 
(549/1154 - 587/1191), Ḥikmat al-Išrāq, as-Suhrawardī is said to have studied 
Sāwī’s book al-Baṣāʾir an-Naṣīriyya259. The Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna 
(d. 683/1284) and following Ibn Kammūna also the Iranian philosopher Quṭb 
ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī (d. 710/1311) in his Persian Durrat at-tāǧ Ǧumla 2, fann 2, 
maqāla 6260, integrated Ibn Sīnā’s concept of a mental relation into his discussion 
of relation in his work al-Kāšif (al-ǧadīd fī l-ḥikma)261; “fatherhood” (abuwwa) 
is a relation (iḍāfa) “added to the notion (mafhūm) of two related things, although 
it is something in (our) reflection (amr iʿtibārī)”; it does not constitute the essence 
(ḏāt) and the humanness (insāniyya) of a person, who became father, “after he 
was not (a father)”.
Interestingly, the Andalusian scholar Abū ṣ-Ṣalt Umayya Ibn ʿAbdalʿazīz Ibn 
Abī ṣ-Ṣalt ad-Dānī, commonly known as Abu Salt of Denia (459/1067 – 528/1134), 
seems to be inspired by Ibn Sīnā, when he describes in his summary of the Aris-
totelian logic, his Taqwīm aḏ-ḏihn, the relation between father and son or between 
slave and master as something existing “potentially” (bi-l-quwwa) or “really” (bi-l-
fiʿl): “Each one of both (e.g. father and son) can be designated (yuʿabbaru) by its 
name, which indicates it insofar as it has a relation (muḍāf)262. 
A late echo, shaped by intermediate sources, is the distinction between acci-
dental and existing (ʿaraḍ mawǧūd) relation (iḍāfa, nisba) and “reflective” 
(iʿtibārī), non-existing relation (an-nisba al-ʿadamiyya) in Muḥammad Ibn 
Muḥammad al-Ḥasanī al-Andalusī al-Mālikī al-Bulaydī (from al-Bulayda, a town 
in Algeria; a student of Zabīdī, who came to Cairo in 1167/1754), al-Maqūlāt 
al-ʿašr or Nayl as-Saʿādāt fī ʿilm al-maqūlāt263. 
Ibn Sīnā later argues that the assumption of relations in things would lead to 
an infinite chain of relations, e.g. between father and son, who each will have an 
equal relation264.
This relation between father and son is classified by Ibn Sīnā as pertaining to 
“action and passion” (al-fiʿl wa-l-infiʿāl), one of the categories related to rela-
tion265. “Action and passion” is an alternative rendering of cause and effect; it 
confirms a recent interpretation of causality as relation in Ibn Sīnā and in Ghazālī 
and its exemplification in the God-world relationship, as elaborated by Ibn Sīnā266. 
259. See Suhrawardī, 1999: 49 § 65; and Walbridge’s and Ziai’s introduction to the edition.
260. See Pourjavady and Schmidtke, 2004: 327.
261. See Ibn Kammūna, 2008: 187-191, esp. 89, 4-10.
262. See Abusalt de Denia, 1915: 11, 24 - 12, 1 / Spanish translation: 66. The terminology bi-l-quwwa 
and bi-l-fiʿl has a parallel in Ibn Sīnā’s Kitāb al-Muḫtāṣar al-awsaṭ fī l-manṭiq, Kalbarczyk, 2012: 
339, 3.
263. Bulaydī, 1974: 44-45, esp. 44, 11-15.
264. Cf. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 120, 7-13 and 122, 13-15.
265. See Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 117, 14, in a chapter, which enumerates “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, 
“place”, “time”, “action”, “passion” (Marmura: “affection“) and “relatives” as categories, cf. 
Lizzini, 2013: 175. 
266. Cf. the article by Lizzini, 2013. On echoes of the concept of relation as causality in Ibn Sīnā’s 
theory of demonstration in his Kitāb al-Burhān, inspired by Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora, cf. 
Strobino, 2016.
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However, Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of intermediate causes between the absolute first 
cause and the effect is not only a “reinterpretation” of Aristotle’s “analysis of 
causality”267. It is an elaboration of Aristotle’s denial of an infinite chain of caus-
es in favour of the first unmoved mover268, by integrating the Neoplatonic doctrine 
of a transcendent God and of intermediate causes, emanating from the divine first 
cause269. Simultaneously, the intermediate causes are ontologically inferior to the 
divine first cause, and for this reason Ibn Sīnā differed from Aristotle’s principle 
of “man begets man” (ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ) and assumed a difference 
between cause and effect. The cause is superior to existence and there are different 
modes of existence (esse, wuǧūd) with regard to priority and posteriority, self-suf-
ficiency and need, necessity and possibility. Consequently, the divine first cause 
has more “truth” than the effect and the cause-effect relationship includes both, 
similarity and dissimilarity270. 
This observation is momentous for the relation between cause and effect, 
including the relation between father and son, respectively between fatherhood 
and sonship. Ibn Sīnā declares: “As for a state (ḥāla) posited for [both] father-
hood and sonship, this is something unknown to us and has no name”271. Ibn Sīnā 
dissociates himself from Fārābī’s assumption of a common notion between e.g. 
roof and house or father and son272, and consequently dissociates himself from 
Fārābī’s suggestion that the name of a “relative” “can be taken for both in the 
relation of each one to the other”273. For Ibn Sīnā any relation assumed between 
two relatives is something developed in the human intellect — equally any rela-
tion between the first divine cause and the world. He says: “We do not mean by 
‘the First’ an idea (maʿnā) that is added to the necessity of His existence so that, 
by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple, but by it we mean a con-
sideration (iʿtibār) of His relation to [what is] other [than Him]”274. This aspect 
of relation as something developed in the human intellect was taken over in the 
Middle Ages: Through the Latin translation of his Kitāb aš-Šifāʾ in the 12thcen-
tury in Toledo Ibn Sīnā might have inspired medieval theories about relations as 
entia rationis275.
267. Lizzini, 2013: 169.
268. Cf. the references in Aristotle and a parallel in early Islamic theology (Muʿammar Ibn ʿAbbād 
as-Sulamī) in Daiber, 1975: 89f.; and id., 1991: 259.
269. On the Neoplatonic doctrine and its impact on Ghazālī’s theory of causality cf. Daiber, 2015a; 
Lizzini, 2013: 180, n. 67 mentions possible Neoplatonic echoes only incidentally and does not 
elaborate this important and decisive detail.
270. Cf. Daiber, 2004b: 32.
271. See n. 255.
272. See his Kitāb al-Ḥurūf, Fārābī, 1970: 85, 9-17, which is translated above ch. 8, in the text § 41 
and referred to by Marmura, 1975: 87, n. 16.
273. Fārābī, 1970: 86, 5f. / translated above ch. 8 (§ 42 in the text).
274. Ibn Sīnā, 2005: 273, 10f.; cf. Lizzini, 2013: 185, 188-194.
275. Cf. the references given in Lizzini, 2013: 168, n. 9. — On the reception of Ibn Sīnā‘s discussion 
in Albertus Magnus (who perhaps used a Latin collection of Avicennian excerpts) cf. Caminada 
2017, 86-97. 
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As has been shown recently276, Ibn Sīnā considered the ten Aristotelian cate-
gories as emanations from the divine universal intellect (al-ʿaql al-kullī), which 
later is called the active intellect (al-ʿaql al-faʿʿāl), the giver of forms277. The 
process of the integration of the ten categories in his emanationist doctrine begins 
with early texts like Ibn Sīnā’s Compendium of the Soul (Kitāb fī n-Nafs ʿalā sun-
nat al-iḫtiṣār) and al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya and is followed by al-Muḫtaṣar al-awsaṭ 
and finally the Šifāʾ. During this process Ibn Sīnā began to distinguish between 
substantial forms and accidental qualities278 and to develop his “metaphysics of 
the rational soul (an-nafs an-nāṭiqa)”, which through its intellectual activity can 
return to its divine first cause279. 
Remarkably, Ibn Sīnā mentions in his early al-Ḥikma al-ʿarūḍiyya280 the ten 
Aristotelian categories in two lists, one containing all categories (including “sub-
stance”) and another one distinguishing between substances and their accidents 
“quality”, “quantity”, “passion”, “where”, “position” and “relation” — omitting 
“when”, “possession” and “action”. This omission can be explained with the obser-
vation that the accidental “concomitants” (lawāzim)281, the categories related to the 
substances, cannot be “action”, cannot have “possession” on their own and cannot 
have their own space of “time” (“when”). Moreover, it seems that Ibn Sīnā consid-
ered the “first body” to be identical with the “material form”282, to be endowed with 
“quality” and “quantity” and “passion”. Consequently, the existence of the “second” 
(body) is related to “where” and “position”, this in addition to the other categories 
(except for “substance”). The categories have a hierarchical order with “substance”, 
at the beginning followed by the “accidents”, “in accordance with their (kinds of) 
existence due to them” (fī istiḥqāq al-wuǧūd). A central role is attributed to “rela-
tion”, which is said to exist “with the existence of the first caused”. Relation here 
is causal relation between the divine necessarily existing One, and the multiplicity 
of the caused, of existing matter283. This multiplicity can be interpreted as some-
thing determined by the categories which shape the accidents of the substance. 
At the same time, any relation, assumed between two relatives is — as already 
said — something developed in the human intellect — equally any relation 
between the first divine cause and the world. Ibn Sīnā says: “We do not mean by 
‘the First’ an idea (maʿnā) that is added to the necessity of His existence so that, 
by it, the necessity of His existence becomes multiple, but by it we mean a con-
sideration (iʿtibār) of His relation to [what is] other [than Him]”284.
Ibn Sīnā’s philosophy of relation appears to be a complex combination of 
Aristotelian and Neoplatonic concepts, in which Fārābī played a considerable role. 
276. Eichner, 2013.
277. Eichner, 2013: 62. On Ibn Sīnā’s doctrine of the active intellect cf. Davidson, 1992: 74-126.
278. For details see the article by Eichner, 2013.
279. Cf. Eichner: 2013: 66.
280. Ibn Sīnā, 2007: 163, 13-19 / translated by Eichner, 2013: 69.
281. Cf. Eichner, 2013: 71f.
282. Cf. Eichner, 2013: 75.
283. Cf. Eichner, 2013: 70.
284. See n. 274.
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His echo in Ibn Sīnā mirrors sympathy and critique and through Ibn Sīnā and the 
Latin translations of Ibn Sīnā‘s works his ideas became known in Islamic philos-
ophy in the West, although in a modified manner. 
10. Ibn Rušd and his Critique of Ghaza¯lı¯
After Ibn Sīnā the great Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd/Averroes (520/1126 - 
595/1198) and the Latin translations of his works disseminated essential ideas of 
Ibn Sīnā (including Fārābī), although in the shape of critical objections. 
Ibn Rušd kept to the Neoplatonic background and the ontological interpretation, 
combined with the Farabian-Avicennian logic of relation. Simultaneously, Ibn Rušd 
deviated from Ibn Sīnā in an interesting return to Aristotle. Like Aristotle he con-
centrated on the relata, the fundaments of any relation, and in his socalled Middle 
Commentary on Aristotle’s Categories Ibn Rušd does not only present a faithful 
description285: In one point he tries to clarify Aristotle’s discussion of the “sub-
stance” as a “relative”, a classification, which — according to Aristotle — must 
be denied in the case of e.g. a head or a hand, which both cannot be related to 
someone, whose head or hand they are definitely, according to our knowledge286. 
Ibn Rušd missed a clear judgement about categories belonging to relation287, and 
in view of Aristotle’s vagueness with regard to a clear classification of categories 
as relatives he refers in his commentary on Aristotle, Cat. 7 b 15 - 8 a 12, at the 
end of ch. 6, to Aristotle, Metaphysics, where Aristotle is said to distinguish288 
between essential and accidental correlatives. Accordingly, Ibn Rušd explains Aris-
totle’s example of the head belonging to a man not as being a “true relation” (iḍāfa 
ḥaqīqiyya), but as an “accidental relation” (iḍāfa ʿaraḍiyya)289.
In his monograph on metaphysics, called Epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 
a rearrangement of the Aristotelian material, Ibn Rušd further developed his clas-
sification of the categories, namely “substance”, and the accidents “quantity”, 
“quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and 
“passion”290. From these ten categories the category “substance” is extensively 
discussed by Ibn Rušd, because it is the only category, which can become essen-
285. See Ibn Rušd, 1980: 107-119 / English translation by Butterworth, 1985: 50-60 / medieval Latin 
translation = Commentum medium super Libro Praedicamentorum Aristotelis, 2010: 56-76. 
286. Aristotle, Cat. 7. 8 a 14 — 8 b 21.
287. Ibn Rušd, 1980: 119, 12f. / transl. Butterworth, 1985: 60. This passage is at the same time a 
rendering of Aristotle, Cat. 7. 8 b 22-24 in a wrong way.
288. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics V, 15. 1021 b 3-11 and Ibn Rušd, 1942: 619, 12 - 621, 6 / medieval 
Latin translation (was started by Michel Scot between 1220 and 1224: Cf. Daiber, 2012a: 141), 
1971: 177, 160 - 178, 180.
289. Ibn Rušd, 1980: 118, 4f. / transl. Butterworth, 1985: 59.
290. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 13, 5 - 14, 14 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 32f. Ibn Rušd’s Talḫīṣ mā baʿd aṭ-ṭabīʿa, 
in the edition and Spanish translation by Quirós Rodríguez, 1919, Compendio de Metafísica, was 
the basis of the only article on relation in Ibn Rušd by Gómez Nogales, 1976: 302-305, supple-
mented by other texts. The article (regrettably often without exact references to the sources) can 
still be recommended, although we differ in details and accentuations, because of additional texts 
and interpretations, which appeared in the meantime.
468  Enrahonar. Supplement Issue, 2018 Hans Daiber
tially a “relative” e.g. “fatherhood and sonship” (al-abuwwa wa-l-banuwwa)”291. 
The thing’s essence and its quiddity is declared as the numerical one in allusion to 
Aristotle, Metaph. V 6. 1016 b 3-5 and defended against Ibn Sīnā’s classification 
of the numerical one only as an accident in the substance “or anything else that is 
isolated”292. It is also “one essentially intelligible concept”293 and “one” in genus 
and species294. “The category of “substance” is self-constituted and with respect 
to its existence independent from any of the accidental categories, while these in 
turn for their existence depend on “substance” and are caused by it”295. To these 
categories, depending on “substance”, belongs “relation”, which neither can be 
separated from its substrate “substance”, nor from the remaining categories because 
of their relatedness to substrates296.
Ibn Rušd did not confine himself to a substance-orientated concept of “relation” 
and reveals indications of a new evaluation of “relation”: He says, with regard to 
Aristotle’s simultaneousness of two correlatives297, that “both are simultaneous in 
being and in knowledge” and argues that “this category (sc. “relation”) is some-
thing the soul introduces into the existents”. He adds, that through this relationship 
(al-iḍāfa) the two subjects of the correlated things can be conceptualized 
(taṣawwur) and vice versa the relationship of the two subjects can be conceptual-
ized298. The conceptualization is dependent on the soul. 
This is further explained in Ibn Rušd’s Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, in a critique of 
Ghazālī’s statement that “the relation and two relatives form a plurality of knowl-
edge, and that for instance our knowledge of fatherhood is different from our 
knowledge of the father and the son”299. 
According to Ghazālī, there are three kinds of knowledge: Knowledge of the 
essence (ḏāt) of the father, knowledge of the essence of the son, and knowledge 
of the “relation” which is enclosed (muḍamman) in the two preceding kinds of 
knowledge. They “condition each other” (baʿḍuhā mašrūṭatun fī l-baʿḍ)300. Ghazālī 
explains this301 with the divine “First”, knowing Himself and the “individual gen-
era” (āḥād al-aǧnās), to which He has a relation as their “principle” (mabdaʾ). 
“Otherwise, the relation’s being known to Him becomes unintelligible (lam 
yuʿqal)”. Ghazālī’s statement is remarkable for several reasons:
291. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 14, ult. / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 33.
292. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 19, 12 - 20, 5 / transl. Arnzen 2010: 38f.
293. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 20, 6-12 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 39, with reference in n. 78 to Aristotle, Metaph. 
X (I) 1. 1052 a 29f.
294. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 20, 13 - 21, 2 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 40.
295. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 35, 14f. / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 54.
296. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 36, 1-15 / transl. Arnzen 2010: 54.
297. Cf. Cat. 7. 7 b 15-31; 13. 14 b 24-35.
298. Cf. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 82, 13 - 83, 9 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 98f.
299. Ibn Rušd, 1987: 12f. / transl. Bergh, 1969: I, 211. The passage from Ghazālī is a shortened render-
ing of Ghazālī, Tahāfut al-falāsifa, ed./transl. Marmura, 2000: 105, 5-9.
300. Ghazālī, 2000, ed./transl. Marmura: 105, 9.
301. Ghazālī, 2000, ed./transl. Marmura: 105, 9-12. The passage is not discussed in Griffel, 2009.
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1) He considers “relation” as causal connection between two relatives.
2) Relation is part of an epistemological process and knowledge is the bridge bet-
ween two relatives.
3) The example of the divine “principle” illustrates the causal relation between 
knower and known, and also between cause and effect.
4) Aristotle’s classification of “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) as a “relative”, because 
knowledge and knowable things condition each other302, appears to tend to a new 
evaluation of “relation” and the “relative”, which is already alluded to in Aristotle’s 
statement “and if those things are relatives for which being is the same as being 
somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer may be found”303. Ghazālī 
did not develop this into a new concept of “relation” but added to this the concept of 
knowledge as connecting relation between knower and known304. Regrettably, other 
logical works by Ghazālī do not discuss this in a more detailed manner and instead 
give — in the footsteps of Ibn Sīnā — summarizing reports of the ten Aristotelian 
categories, including the substance and the nine accidental categories305.
In his critique of Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the Philosophers Ibn Rušd did not 
realize the subtleties of Ghazālī’s remarks and denied Ghazālī’s epistemological 
aspects. Instead he says: “Now, the truth is that the relation is an attribute addition-
al to two correlated things, from outside the soul and in the existents; however, the 
relation in the concepts (al-maʿqūlāt) is rather a state (ḥāl) than an attribute (ṣifa) 
additional to two correlated things”. The following passage can be interpreted as an 
indication of the inexplicability of this state of fatherhood; the human knowledge 
(al-ʿilm al-insānī) of it cannot reach the stage of divine eternal knowledge (al-ʿilm 
al-azalī) in a way “from the visible to the invisible” (min aš-šāhid ilā l-ġāʾib)306. 
Only accessible to human knowledge are existents, which share the same genus or 
species307. This looks like an elaboration of Ibn Sīnā’s already quoted statement “as 
for a state (ḥāla) posited for [both] fatherhood and sonship, this is something 
unknown to us and has no name”308. Ibn Rušd’s declaration is, as in Ibn Sīnā, based 
on the Neoplatonic doctrine of the First Intellect: “It is pure act and cause; (God’s) 
knowledge cannot be compared to human knowledge”309. It culminates in Ibn 
Rušd’s description of the human intellect as “conceptualization (taṣawwur) of the 
302. Cat. 7. 6 b 2; cf. 6 b 34-36.
303. 8 a 31f.; translation ed. Barnes, 1984: I, 13. Cf. Oehler, 1984: 252f.
304. On this cf. now Griffel, 2017: here 203.
305. Cf. n. 248. 
306. Ibn Rušd, 1987: 351, 1-4 / transl. Bergh, 1969: I, 211.
307. Ibn Rušd, 1987: 351, 4f. / transl. Bergh, 1969: I, 211.
308. See n. 255.
309. Ibn Rušd, 1987: 462, 9f. / transl. Bergh, 1969: I, 280. Cf. also Ibn Rušd, aḍ-Ḍamīma, appendix 
to Ibn Rušd, 1959, 43, 1-45, ult. / German translation by Griffel, 2010: 54-57, commentary 210-
212. According to Ibn Rušd, knowledge of existing things is not identical with God’s causing 
knowledge, which has no beginning (qadīm; on this cf. Griffel, 2010: 122-127). For this reason, 
Ibn Rušd denies God’s knowledge of the particulars (al-guzʾiyāt), which are something effected 
in time (muḥdaṯ); this would affect God’s transcendence (tanzīh, Ibn Rušd, 1959: 44, 6 / Griffel, 
2010: 56). On Averroes’s doctrine of the active intellect as a cause of existence cf. Davidson, 
1992: 220-356; and the article by Freudenthal, 2002.
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order and system present in this world and in each of its parts and (as) the knowl-
edge of all that is in this (world) through its remote and proximate causes up to a 
complete (knowledge of) the world”310. In accordance with the Neoplatonic system 
of emanations in gradations from first, intermediate to last effects311 and the 
assumed dissimilarity between cause and effect, the epistemological consequence 
for the human conceptualization of relationship can be summarized as follows: 
1) As the subject of human conceptualization (taṣawwur) “consists of material 
things (al-umūr al-hayūlāniyya) only”312, human concepts of relation are restricted 
to the substances and its accidents, the categories “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, 
“where”, “when”, “position”, “possession”, “action” and “passion”.
2) The process of conceptualization is affected by the soul.
3) The imperfectness of this conceptualization is an echo of the indeterminateness 
of the relation between the relatives.
4) The Neoplatonic concept of indeterminate relation313 appears in Ibn Rušd to be 
connected with the concept of potentiality as “a disposition (istiʿdād) in a thing and 
(as) its inherent possibility (imkān) of existing in actuality”314. 
5) The indeterminateness of relation and its correlation with the concept of potentiali-
ty is not developed to a clear concept of a dynamic process between relation, relatives 
and linguistic conceptualization. In his Great Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, on 
Aristotle’s classification of the continuous and of matter and form as “relative”315, Ibn 
Rušd declares relation as something accompanying any transmutation316. 
This explanation must be understood from the context of Aristotle’s concept 
of motion as a process from potentiality to actuality, namely with regard to the 
three categories “quality”, “quantity” and “place”317, a concept which Ibn Rušd 
310. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 144, 18-ult. / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 159.
311. Cf. also Ibn Rušd, 1958: 116, 14 - 117, 2 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 131; Ibn Rušd, 1958: 144, 1 - 146, 
7 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 159-161; Ibn Rušd, 1958: 153, 8 - 155, 2 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 169-170. 
On Ibn Rušd’s concept of causality, which in his Tahāfut at-Tahāfut and in his Great Commentary 
on Aristotle’s Metaphysics appears to be overshadowed by the Aristotelian model: see Kogan, 
1987: 310f.
312. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 145, 17 / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 161.
313. Cf. Plotinus, 1988, Enneads VI 3. 28 and VI 1. 7 and 8; the “existence” (ὑπόστασις) of relation 
depends on the state of relation (σχέσις) and not on the related subjects (ὑποκείμενα), see Ploti-
nus, 1988: VI 1. 7, 24-28; moreover, states of relation (σχέσεις) are rational principles (λόγοι) 
and their causes are “participations in forms” καὶ εἰδῶν μεταλήψεις αἰτίας (Plotinus, 1988: VI 
1. 9, 7-9).
314. Ibn Rušd, 1958: 83, 14f. / transl. Arnzen, 2010: 99.
315. Cf. Aristotle, Physics II 2. 194 b 8.
316. Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois commentariis IV: Physica (Venice 1562-1574, repr. Frankfurt/M.: 
Minerva 1962), text comm. 9, p. 345, quoted by Gómez Nogales, 1976: 301, n. 41. According 
to Gómez Nogales, the concept of relation as accident and as something affecting all categories, 
including the substances, has similarity to relativism in modern philosophy: “Toda la realidad 
está afectada de cierto relativismo”. Cf. also Ibn Rušd, 1958: 38, 10-12 / Arnzen, 2010: 56: “For 
a thing is related to time only in so far it is changeable or one conceives a process of change in 
it. But the changeable is necessarily a body, as has been shown in Physics”. Arnzen (2010: 277, 
n. 190) refers to Aristotle, Physics. IV 11. 218 b 22 — 219 a 14 and to Ibn Rušd, 1983: 96-101.
317. Aristotle, Physics, 243 a 35-37.
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took over from Ibn Sīnā, aš-Šifāʾ, Physics, who had added the category of “posi-
tion” as fourth category and who considered “substance” as an object of motion, 
and no more as a substrate for accidents, herein followed later in the 13th century 
by Barhebraeus, a scholar of the Syriac orthodox church and chief bishop of Persia, 
in his encyclopaedia Butyrum sapientiae, the book on Physics318. He explained 
motion in the category of “substance” as the change of man from potentiality — i.e. 
seed — into actuality — i.e. humanness; in a corresponding manner motion is in 
the category of “relation” the change from fatherhood in potentiality into father-
hood in reality, the father of a son319. Relation is causality, as explained by Ibn 
Sīnā320 and taken over by Barhebraeus321. As in the late Aristotle categories are 
universals existing as “mere potencies in other existents” 321a.
11. Ibn ‘Arabı¯
“Relation” in Ibn Rušd appears to be something accidental to the “substance” and 
simultaneously something essential322. This ambivalence and the Neoplatonic 
background, which Ibn Rušd shares with Ibn Sina, have parallels in the younger 
contemporary Ibn ʿArabī, a Sufi born in Murcia in 560/1165 (d. 638/1240 in 
Damascus) and a representative of a trend introducing philosophical elements in 
sufism in the footsteps of Ghazālī323, his model324. Ibn ʿArabī perhaps is inspired 
by Ibn Rušd’s and Ibn Sīnā’s concept of categories and their Neoplatonic idea of 
the emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world of 
creation. This would explain, why Ibn ʿArabī related the ten divine aspects of the 
“Creator” (al-mūǧid) to the ten Aristotelian categories applicable to “every order 
in the world”325:
(1) God’s “essence” (ḏāt) to the “substance (ǧawhar) of the world”
(2) God’s “attributes” (ṣifāt) to the “accident” (ʿaraḍ)
(3) God’s “eternity” (azal) to the “time” (zamān)
(4) God’s “sitting” on the throne (istiwāʾ) to the “place” (makān)
(5) God’s “names” (asmāʾ) to the “quantity” (kamm)
(6) God’s “assent” and “indignation” (riḍāʾ and ġaḍab) to the “quality” (kayf)
(7) God’s “word” (kalām) to the “position” (al-waḍʿ)
(8) God’s “lordship” (rubūbiyya) to the “relation” (iḍāfa)
318. Cf. Schmitt, in print: translation § 3.4.1.
319. Cf. Schmitt, in print: translation § 3.4.2.
320. See n. 267.
321. Cf. also Kouriyhe, 2010: §§ 7.2.2-3 / translation: 105. I owe this reference to Jens Ole Schmitt, 
University of Würzburg/Germany.
321a.  Cf. Brakas, 1988: 52 and 93-107.
322. This ambivalence caused Pico della Mirandola in the 15th century to reject the accidentality of 
relations and to defend its essentiality with a reference to Averroes: Cf. Flasch, 1974: here 20-22.
323. Cf. Akasoy, 2012: 36.
324. Cf. Rosenthal, 1988: 35.
325. Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: II, 304, 14-18 / transl. Rosenthal, 1988: 23: “Every order in the world of lights 
and darkness, subtle and coarse (matters), simple and composite (matters), substances, accidents, 
times, places, relations, qualities, quantities, positions, activa and passiva”.
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(9) His “creating” (īǧād) to “action” (an yafʿala)
(10) God’s “response” (īǧāba) to man’s prayers to “passion” (an yanfaʿila)326.
These relations can explain, why Ibn Arabī calls the bridge between God and 
the world with the sufi term an-nafas ar-raḥmānī (Ibn ʿArabī: at-tanaffus 
ar-raḥmānī or nafas ar-raḥmān327) “the breath of compassion”, which became a 
vehicle for God’s words, His creatures. The divine essence (= the category “sub-
stance”) is manifested in the world in the divine attributes (they correspond in the 
world to the category “accident”), namely “Living”, “Knowing”, “Willing” and 
“Saying” or “the First”, “the Last”, “the Manifest” and “the Hidden”328. Mere 
explaining analogies are the “fundamental categories” (ummahāt al-maqūlāt) “sub-
stance”, “accident”, “time” and “place”329. Moreover, within the sufi concept of an 
identity of the all-permeating infinite divine power and infinite divine acting330, we 
find the category of “relation” of God’s sovereignty to the world and the category 
of “passion” (an yanfaʿila) of God, who answers (al-muǧīb) man’s prayer of 
request331.
Ibn ʿArabī’s integration of the categories in a Neoplatonic concept of an ema-
national connection between the divine absolute being and the world of creation 
through the all-permeating divine power transformed “relation” into a dynamic 
process, in which the infinite is procreated from the One332.
Herewith, Ibn ʿArabī gave his own answer in contemporary discussions about 
the often discussed question, if and how the divine One creates multiplicity. Ibn 
Sīnā and in his footsteps William of Auvergne (born between 1180 and 1190), but 
also Ibn Rušd333 defended the principle “Ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi 
unum”334. Ibn ʿArabī, who met Ibn Rušd in Cordoba around 1185335, expressis 
verbis denies this dictum, which he attributes to al-ḥakīm “the philosopher”336. 
326. See Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: II, 211, 29-33; and on the equation with the divine aspects, 435, 8-11. 
Remarkable is the identical terminology an yafʿala and an yanfaʿila in Ibn Sīnā (see n. 224) and 
before him in Fārābī (see n. 150). On the reception of the Aristotelian categories in Ibn Arabī cf. 
Nyberg, 1919: 33-38; Rosenthal, 1988: 23; and the article Gril, 2005. On the equation of the divine 
aspects with the ten categories Gril, 2005: 160; interestingly, the divine attributes appear to be 
replaced by the category “accident”. Nyberg, Rosenthal and Gril refrain from a detailed compar-
ison with Islamic philosophers. Pacheco, 2010, does not discuss the Aristotelian categories.
327. Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: III, 197, 29f. On the term and its Ismaili background, shaped by the Brethren 
of Purity (Rasāʾil Iḫwān aṣ-Ṣafāʾ), cf. Ebstein, 2014: 53-56 and index.
328. See Gril, 2005: 162, n. 23.
329. Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: III, 404, 22; cf. Gril, 2005: 162, n. 24; Rosenthal, 1988: 28f.
330. On Ibn Arabī (and his impact of his concept of the descents of the divine absolute being on Mollā 
Ṣadrā) cf. Daiber, 2018.
331. Cf. Gril, 2005: 163, with reference to Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: IV, 255 (chapter on Ḥaḍrat al-iǧāba).
332. On Ibn ʿArabī’s concept of what can be called “ex uno potest fieri infinitum”, cf. Bausani, 1978: 
esp. 209f.
333. Cf. Freudenthal, 2002: 114f.
334. Cf. Teske, 1993. This dictum was condemned as an Averroistic doctrine in 1277 by the bishop 
Stephan Tempier and denied by Albertus Magnus: cf. Grabmann, 1936; and Libera, 1991.
335. Cf. Meyer, 1986.
336. Ibn ʿArabī, 1968: II, 458, 19f.; Rosenthal, 1988: 31 tentatively attributes this to Aristotelianism, 
by referring to Aristotle, Metaph. 1016 b 3-5 and to Ibn Rušd, 1942: 540, 17. Interestingly, Ibn 
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He might have encouraged his younger contemporary Naṣīraddīn aṭ-Ṭūsī in his 
critical attitude towards Ibn Sīnā’s dictum that “from the truly One only one can 
proceed”337.
12. Ibn Sab‘ı¯n
A younger contemporary of Ibn ʿArabī, the Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn (ca 
614/1217 - 668/1269 or 669/1271) appears to have disagreed with the position of 
Ibn ʿArabī in his philosophical work Budd al-ʿārif wa-ʿaqīdat al-muḥaqqiq al-
muqarrib al-kāšif wa-ṭarīq as-sālik al-mutabattil al-ʿākif  “The escape of the know-
er and the belief of the seeker of truth, who is approaching and investigating (it) and 
the way of the traveller, who remains retired and secluded (from the world)”. The 
chapter on “relation” (iḍāfa)338 begins with the bipartition of the relation into naẓīr 
and ġayr an-naẓīr, and classifies it as a “simple” category, which like substance, 
quantity and quality can be combined with the six “composed” categories “where” 
(ayna), “when” (matā), “possession” (lahū), “position” (nuṣba), “action” (fāʿil) 
and “passion” (yanfaʿil)339.
This appears to be based on the Epistles of the Brethren of Purity340. The chap-
ter ends341 with a critical evaluation of the relation belonging to the “kind of qual-
ity” like the relation between knowledge (al-ʿilm) and known (al-maʿlūm) or per-
ceived (al-maḥsūs) and other “contrary things” (mutaqābilāt)342: They are imperfect 
(nāqiṣa wa-mankūsa)343 because of their multiplicity (kaṯra)344, they are opposing 
the “supreme (divine) attributes” (aṣ-ṣifāt al-ʿaliyya) and the “unity (tawḥīd) 
of the (divine) attributes (al-ḫawāṣṣ)”345. Ibn Sabʿīn remarks: “Strictly speaking 
from relation only imagination (wahm) remains, which vanishes (yaḏhab); through 
its disappearance (ḏahāb) perfection (kamāl) can occur among those who investi-
gate the truth (al-muḥaqqiqīn)”346. Apparently, Ibn Sabʿīn criticized the use of the 
Taymiyya, who was visited by Ibn ʿArabī in 708/1309 or 1310 in Alexandria, denied the same 
dictum, but simultaneously he criticized Ibn ʿArabī’s monism of being, the waḥdat al-wuǧūd (a 
term which Ibn ʿArabī himself did not yet use): cf. Kügelgen, 2005: 171 and 175. On the echo 
of Ibn ʿArabī in Ibn Taymiyya cf. Knysh, 1998: 87-111.
337. According to Hermann Landolt Ṭūsī modified Ibn Sīnā’s explanation by referring to Ismailite 
and Ishrāqī philosophy: see Landolt, 2000: 22-28. Ṭūsī’s solution to introduce the (Neoplatonic) 
intermediary between the divine One and the many things also appears in al-Kāšif (al-ǧadīd fī 
l-ḥikma, cf. Ibn Kammūna, 2008: 124, 5-7) of his contemporary, the Jewish philosopher Ibn 
Kammūna (d. 683/1284), who, however, does not follow the Ismailis, who identified the inter-
mediary with God’s “Command” or “Word”. 
338. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 71f. 
339. Described in Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72-79 and in Ibn Sabʿīn, al-Masāʾil aṣ-ṣiqilliyya, addressed to 
the emperor Frederick II, ed. Akasoy, 2006: 388, 16 - 389, 2 / translation: 515f.
340. See ch. 6. On further parallels between Ibn Sabʿīn and the Epistles cf. Lohr, 1984: 71f.
341. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 3-17.
342. Cf. Aristotle, Cat. 6 b 34f.; 11 a 25-27, and on the contrary quality 10 b 13.
343. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 4.
344. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 7.
345. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 11.
346. Cf. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 72, 6.
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categories in Sufi theology, especially the category “relation” as something ending 
in “imagination”. Their use implies multiplicity and affects God’s unity. It might 
be a critical allusion to the school of Ibn ʿArabī and his model al-Ghazālī and 
prefers the position of Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd. This critical attitude is perhaps an 
additional reason why Ibn Sabʿīn could say about Ghazālī: “One time he is a Sufi, 
another time a philosopher, a third time an Ashʿarite, a fourth time a jurist, and a 
fifth time a perplexed man”347.
Remarkably, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical attitude towards the Sufism of Ibn Arabī is 
not yet developed in his Masāʾil as-siqilliyya addressed to the emperor Frederick 
II, in which he does not consider the categories as something imperfect and instead 
assesses the ten categories as “the world generally” (alʿālam bi-l-ǧumla) and man 
as a being in which the categories are “collected” (maǧmūʿa); “this is necessarily 
comprehended in the intellect (maʿqūl), and in the conception (taṣawwur) and 
necessarily accepted as true (taṣdīq)”; man and world “resemble each other” 
(mutamāṯil); “man and world are one”348. This is an allusion to Ibn ʿArabī’s doc-
trine of macrocosm and microcosm, according to which God manifests Himself in 
the heart of man349. It confirms Ibn ʿArabī’s assessment of the categories as fun-
damentals of the world (s. above); according to Ibn Sabʿīn’s al-Masāʾil as-siqilli-
yya the categories are in a Neoplatonizing manner necessary, have no cause, exist 
by themselves, are permanently, do not change and are essentially one350.
13.  A Medieval Latin Echo of Neoplatonizing Islamic Thought:  
Ramon Llull
Interestingly, Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical view of the category of “relation” in his Budd 
al-ʿārif is not shared by his younger contemporary Ramon Llull (1232 -1315 or 
1316 AD). This Catalan philosopher and mystic had knowledge of the Aristotelian 
Organon, including the categories and wrote a Compendium logicae Algazelis, in 
which he used Ghazālī’s Maqāṣid al-falāsifa, a description of Ibn Sīnā’s philoso-
phy on the basis of Ibn Sīnā’s Persian Dānišnāma351. In addition, Llull must have 
known other Arabic sources, including Ibn Sabʿīn352. With regard to Llull’s concept 
of the categories, especially of relation, we detect parallels with the sufi philoso-
pher Ibn ʿArabī. We can contrast Llull’s concept of relatio substantialis with Ibn 
ʿArabī’s category (1) “substance” qua “Creator” or divine “essence”, (2) “relation” 
qua divine “lordship” and (3) “action” qua act of “creating”353: Llull gives as an 
example the substantial relation, existing in God, between Father, Son and Holy 
347. Ibn Sabʿīn, 1978: 144 / translation Akasoy, 2012: 38.
348. Ibn Sabʿīn, 2006: 383, 14-17 / translation: 507f.
349. Cf. Takeshita, 1987: 100ff., 113ff.; Ebstein, 2014: 189-212.
350. Ibn Sabʿīn, 2006: 392, 8 - 393, 2 / translation: 521f.
351. See n. 248. On echoes of Aristotles’ Categories in Ramon Llull cf. the articles Higuera Rubio, 
2009; 2011; 2014; 2015 and 2016.
352. Cf. Akasoy and Fidora, 2008.
353. See ch. 11. 
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Ghost354 and the corresponding relation in created things, e.g. the relation between 
form and matter in the substance fire; this relation qua form indicates multiplicity, 
“like the multiplicity (pluralitas) between father and son”355. Relation is a “coes-
sential” (coessentiale) (real) relative, something that coessentially can have a rela-
tion (referibile) and (coessentially) is the act of relation (referre). In the same way 
substance, which has relation, is something that makes it a (real) substance (subs-
tantiativum), a substance potentially (substantiabile) and the act of being substance 
(substantiare)356. Relation is a basic principle (principium primitivum), and like 
substance it can have coessential principles, like action and passion or quantity 
(maioritas, minoritas) and quality357. Relation can be an accident, inferior to the 
substantial relation358. It is a cause of accidental or substantial action (actio) and 
passion (passio)359. These few selected descriptions360 clearly reveal the new eval-
uation of relation, which in contrast to Aristotle is no more concentrating on rela-
tion as something dependent on the substance. With the Neoplatonizing Islamic 
philosophers — including the sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabī — he shares the classi-
fication of relation as a dynamic and active principle and with Ibn ʿArabī he shares 
the use of the categories as universal forms with a “naturally physical and meta-
physical status”361: Ibn ʿArabī developed his concept of categories as something 
applicable to the order of the world and as something mirrored in the divine aspects 
of the Creator; remarkably, Ibn ʿArabī’s divine categories 1) “substance” = Creator, 
2) “relation” = God’s “lordship” and 3) “acting” = God’s act of creating362, can be 
paralleled with Llull’s trinitarian concept of the substantial relation, existing in 
God, between Father, Son and Holy Ghost and also with Llull’s concept of the 
correlatives, in which the divine attributes appear in a correlation of “acting” (= 
Ibn ʿArabī: God’s act of creating), “action” (= Ibn ʿArabī: Creator = substance) 
and “passion” (= Ibn ʿArabī: God’s “lordship” = relation)363, e.g. in the correlation 
of the divine act of intellegere, the divine intellectus intelligens and the divine 
objectum intellectum364. Apparently, Llull did not follow the alleged Avicennian 
and the Averroistic thesis of “ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi unum”365, 
and similar to Ibn ʿArabī he developed a relationship between God and His crea-
354. Ramon Llull, 1985: 106, B.
355. Ramon Llull, 1985: 112, I; cf. 114, L and 108, C.1.
356. Ramon Llull, 1985: 108, C.2.
357. Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, D.2.
358. Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, D.3.
359. Ramon Llull, 1985: 110, E.1
360. Cf. also the chapters on categories in Johnston, 1987: 62-73 and, on the Logica nova, 202-205; 
and Vittorio Hösle in the introduction to Ramon Llull, 1985: LXVII-LXXV.
361. Cf. on Llull Johnston, 1987: 66.
362. See ch. 11. 
363. Here, we should be aware that Ibn ʿArabī’s “lordship” not only means God’s rule over the world, 
but also the world being ruled by God. Moreover, we should be aware that Ibn ʿArabī in a dif-
fering manner correlates the category “passion” as something related to God, His “response” to 
man’s prayers.
364. Cf. Daiber, 2004a: 151, 158 and 161f.
365. See n. 333, 334 and 336. 
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tion, in which the category “relation” received a new orientation. In “relation”, 
cause and effect are correlated and “relation” is a dynamic process between sub-
stance and relative366. Its integration in Llull’s Christian trinitarian theology, in 
which the created world is an image of the divine trinity367, offers an interesting 
alternative to the Augustinian trinitarian theology, which is also based on Aristo-
tle’s Categories, especially his concept of relation368. The rehabilitation of relation 
since John Scottus Eriugena (ca 801 - ca 877 AD) until Bonaventura (1221-1274 
AD) and (in an inconsistent manner) Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274 AD)369 culmi-
nated in new accentuations of Ramon Llull, developed under the impression of 
Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers including the sufi Ibn ʿArabī. His discussion 
of relation370 forms an essential part of his contributions to logic, which according 
to Alexander Fidora consists in the “dynamization of logical predicates”371.
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